Fifth Circuit Shuts Down Climate Tort Plaintiffs Again

By Robert A. Wyman, Jr., Michael G. Romey, and Aron Potash

Climate tort plaintiffs cannot catch a break in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In a May 14, 2013, decision, the Fifth Circuit found—once again—that a group of Mississippi Gulf Coast property owners is barred from alleging that energy companies tortiously emitted greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). 

The case, Ned Comer, et al. v. Murphy Oil USA, et al., has a long and twisting history and at one point was widely viewed as being in the vanguard of a small handful of cases with the potential to radically realign the legal framework under which companies emit GHGs. 

Comer was originally filed in the Southern District of Mississippi in 2005.  Plaintiff coastal property owners alleged that the defendant companies’ emissions exacerbated climate change, which intensified Hurricane Katrina, which in turn damaged the plaintiffs’ property.  Invoking the federal courts’ jurisdiction over state law claims between citizens of different states, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages asserting state law claims of nuisance, trespass, and negligence, among other claims. The district court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the matter was not justiciable under the political question doctrine. 

In November 2009, a Fifth Circuit panel reversed, in part, the district court’s dismissal of the claims.  The Fifth Circuit panel found that plaintiffs had standing to bring state law public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims challenging energy sector emissions of GHGs and that the claims did not present political questions. 

The Fifth Circuit panel’s decision came in the wake of the Second Circuit’s precedent-setting September 2009 decision in State of Connecticut, et al. v. American Electric Power Company Inc., et al., in which the Second Circuit recognized the validity of federal common law public nuisance claims challenging the emission of GHGs, found that a number of states and private environmental groups had standing to press such claims, and rejected the argument that the claims are nonjusticiable.  Together, these cases were viewed as potentially ushering in a new era in which companies emitting GHGs would need to contend not just with EPA’s regulations but also with common law climate tort claims seeking injunctive relief or money damages.

The new era was not to be.  As to Comer, before the panel opinion’s mandate issued, a majority of the Fifth Circuit’s active, unrecused judges voted to rehear the case en banc.  Under Fifth Circuit rules at the time, this vacated the panel opinion reversing the district court’s dismissal.  Before the Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc, however, another Fifth Circuit judge was recused, leaving the court with only eight active, unrecused judges.  Five of the remaining eight judges then determined that, with the additional recusal, the court lacked a quorum to proceed, and the judges issued in May 2010 an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s decision for lack of a quorum. 

Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court, seeking review of the Fifth’s Circuit dismissal of their appeal.  The Supreme Court denied the petition in January 2011, at which point one might have expected the case to be over. 

However, the same group of property owners proceeded to file a new complaint in May 2011 alleging many of the same nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against the same energy company defendants.  The District Court again dismissed the claims, finding them to be barred by res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations, and also to fail to establish proximate causation and be preempted by the Clean Air Act.  In addition, as it had in Comer I, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims raised nonjusticiable political questions. 

The Fifth Circuit’s May 2013 decision in Comer II upholds the district court’s dismissal of the climate tort claims.  The Fifth Circuit found dispositive the doctrine of res judicata—the principle that a controversy, once decided, shall remain in repose—and did not address the district court’s other grounds for dismissal.  Despite the procedural quirks of Comer I, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s decision in that case to represent a final judgment, never modified on appeal.  In addition, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s final judgment to be on the merits because it adjudicated the jurisdictional issues of standing and justiciability. 

Fall of 2009 may turn out to have been an apogee of sorts for climate tort claims.  In June 2011, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, holding that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of GHG emissions.  Climate tort plaintiff in a third case, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., were also on the losing end of a September 2012 Ninth Circuit panel decision which found the plaintiffs’ claims that climate change would result in erosion and flooding of the island where they live to be a matter that should be left to the legislative and executive branches of government.  The Kivalina plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court in February for a writ of certiorari. 

As GHG levels in the atmosphere approach their highest levels in hundreds of thousands of years or longer, the prospects for new legislative or executive branch action are uncertain.  Although California recently implemented an economy-wide GHG cap and trade scheme which began imposing compliance obligations earlier this year, there appears to be little appetite for comprehensive federal climate change legislation.  EPA proposed in April 2012 a GHG performance standard for new power plants pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority, but the timing for action with respect to existing power plants and other emitting sectors is unclear.  In light of the uncertainty on the regulatory and legislative fronts, and given the massive alleged harms involved, it may be too early to say if the climate tort is essentially finished or will in the future be resuscitated in a new and more potent guise. 

EPA Proposes New Effluent Limitation Guidelines for Power Plants

By Claudia O’Brien, Karl Karg, and Joshua Marnitz

On April 19, 2013, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced proposed technology-based effluent limitation guidelines and standards for steam electric power generating units. The proposed national standards, which are based on data collected from industry, provide for a phased-in approach and the use of technologies already installed at a number of plants. EPA argues that this regulatory action is necessary to reduce the amount of toxic metals and other pollutants discharged to surface waters by power plants, in part because the development of new air pollution control technologies over the past 30 years has altered existing wastewater streams at many power plants, particularly those burning coal.

EPA’s proposal would set federal limits on the levels of toxic metals in wastewater discharged from seven waste streams: flue gas desulfurization (FGD) wastewater, fly ash transport water, bottom ash transport water, combustion residual leachate, nonchemical metal cleaning wastes, and wastewater from flue gas mercury control (FGMC) systems and gasification systems. To that end, EPA presents eight regulatory options for public comment, four of which are EPA’s preferred regulatory alternatives for existing sources. EPA also identifies one preferred alternative for the regulation of new sources. The regulatory options presented by EPA differ in terms of the number of waste streams covered, the size of the units controlled, and the stringency of the controls that would be imposed.  For a detailed summary and discussion of EPA’s preferred alternatives for both existing and new sources, please review our Client Alert available here.  The public comment period on the proposed rule will be open for 60 days from the date the notice is published in the Federal Register.

EPA’s proposed rule is the latest in a series of aggressive rulemakings targeting coal-fired power. In connection with each rulemaking, EPA assesses the economic impact of the individual rule and makes some pronouncement regarding its projected effect, including whether any facilities will be forced to close as a result of the rulemaking. EPA believes compliance with this proposed regulation would be economically achievable – costing between $185 million and $954 million, depending on the alternative chosen – and does not project that it will force any coal-fired plants to close.  In fact, EPA believes that fewer than half of all coal-fired power plants are estimated to incur costs under the proposal because most power plants already have in place the technology and procedures to meet the proposed pollution control standards.

Lacking from this analysis, however, are considerations of the cumulative effects of an avalanche of EPA rules affecting the coal-fired power industry. Since 2009, EPA has proposed at least five major rules that will significantly impact coal-fired power. (The other rules include the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which was vacated by the D.C. Circuit last summer; the coal combustion residuals rule; the cooling water intake structure (§ 316(b)) rule; and the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard.)  In addition, EPA plans to issue greenhouse gas regulations for existing power plants (and has already proposed rules that would prevent new coal-fired power plants from being built without the installation of currently cost-prohibitive carbon capture and sequestration technology), and has imposed greenhouse gas permitting requirements on coal-fired power. EPA’s proposed effluent limitation guidelines will certainly impose significant costs on many facilities, and when coupled with the cost of EPA’s rules under the Clean Air Act, there can be little question that some coal-fired facilities will close as a result.

Potential Changes for the California Environmental Quality Act in S.B. 731

By Christopher Garrett, Jim Arnone and DJ Moore

Many interest groups have urged that the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) needs to be “modernized”, but disagree as to the changes that are needed.  As the California Legislature tackles this challenge, the most visible effort is Senate Bill 731 (S.B. 731) now sponsored by California Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg.  As a bill sponsored by the President pro Tem there is a reasonable likelihood this legislation will pass, whether in this form or in an amended version, so its provisions are of particular interest.

S.B. 731, which faces its first legislative hearing on Wednesday May 1, 2013, was amended last week.  

Rather than broad-based CEQA reform, the bill focuses more narrowly on changing the CEQA process for infill and clean energy projects and makes modest changes in a number of areas. While the bill is intended to benefit infill projects that implement “smart growth” attributes, the extent to which the legislation might result in benefits or burdens to such projects will depend upon new significance thresholds that the bill proposes to be developed by the Resources Agency. The bill also contains a number of new procedural requirements that could lengthen and complicate the CEQA process for all types of projects. Opinions of observers are quite divided as to whether the bill on an overall basis provides greater benefits than burdens to project applicants.

S.B. 731 contains the following proposed changes:

  • Aesthetic impacts for “residential, mixed-use residential, or employment center projects within a transit priority area” would not be considered significant impacts under CEQA.  (“Transit priority area” is defined by S.B. 731 as an area within one-half mile of an existing or planned major transit stop.)   The language is vague about whether this would apply to all residential and mixed-use residential projects, or only those in a transit priority area.
  • The Secretary of Resources would be directed to propose new guidelines for significance of noise, transportation and parking impacts within transit priority areas.  Some have argued that the application by lead agencies of traditional significance thresholds for traffic, parking and noise often has counterproductive effects for infill projects that implement “smart growth” concepts, and the legislation attempts to address these concerns by  requiring the Secretary of Resources to develop new significance thresholds.  For example, for traffic impacts, the bill requires significance thresholds to be developed that are based on a project’s proximity to a multimodal transportation network, its overall transportation accessibility, and its proximity to a diversity of land uses, rather than the “level of service” metric typically used by lead agencies. Of course, the impact of  the bill on the process for these projects will depend upon the significance thresholds developed by the Resources Agency.
  • Opinion is divided as to the benefits of creating new statewide minimum thresholds of significance compared to current law that allows local control on these issues. Moreover, applicants may not be able to place complete reliance on new significance standards contained in these potential Guidelines until potential litigation has ended, because in the past CEQA Guideline standards adopted by the Secretary of Resources have been subject to extensive litigation and at times invalidated.
  • New procedural requirements would be imposed on local and state agencies for CEQA findings.  All public agencies would be required to provide their proposed CEQA findings to the public at least 15 days prior to the proposed approval date and provide a public notice of the availability of the findings for public review.  Additionally, public notice of the availability of these draft findings must be made by electronic mail and by newspaper publication, which as a practical matter means that the documents must be available for a longer period of time.  This new provision would appear to reduce local agency flexibility to respond to project opponents who make late comments by making it more difficult for the local agencies to adopt new or different findings in response to public comments, without going through delay if there is a requirement to “re-notice” revised findings.  The result of this provision could be to potentially increase processing times and procedural risks and delays for projects.  
  • The legislation would give project applicants the option to require the lead agency, for certain types of projects, to post the administrative record electronically as it is created so that it can be filed within 30 days in the event of litigation.  The intent of this provision is to reduce the litigation delay that is caused by lead agencies taking several months to prepare the administrative record once a lawsuit is filed.  However, S.B. 731 further provides that all of the costs of preparing and certifying the electronic record must be reimbursed by the applicant, and the petitioner filing a CEQA lawsuit would not be obligated to advance or reimburse to the public agency the costs of preparing this electronic record, thereby reducing the potential costs to CEQA challengers for filing lawsuits against projects with an electronic record.  Under this provision, public agencies would be required to make all public comments available electronically within 5 business days of receipt of electronic comments, and 7 business days of receipt of non-electronic comments, at the applicant’s expense. The bill is not clear as to the impact of the failure to comply with the new provisions, but this provision could provide a new basis for CEQA lawsuits alleging failure to timely provide materials on an electronic basis while the public agency is considering the project.
  • New requirements would be imposed on local and state agencies for annual monitoring and reporting.  After project approval, for an indefinite time, all public agencies would be required to prepare annual reports available online regarding project compliance with the adopted mitigation and monitoring plan.
  • The bill adds language to Government Code Section 65457 which contains an existing limited exemption from CEQA for residential projects consistent with an adopted Specific Plan, specifying that new information “consisting solely of argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative” or “is clearly inaccurate or erroneous,” or suffers from other defects, should not affect the applicability of the exemption.  It appears that this current language in S.B. 731 simply reflects existing law regarding material that can be considered as “evidence” by a public agency under CEQA, though the stated intention appears to be to strengthen the existing exemption.
  • Section 13 of the bill amends Public Resources Code Section 21168.9(a) to clarify language regarding the requirements for a court order to be issued when a court finds a CEQA violation, including the circumstances under which a portion of the approved project can be “severed” from the Court’s decision overturning the project approval.  This section of the bill also specifies that an agency found to have violated CEQA must be ordered by the court to provide an “initial return” to a writ of mandate specifying what must be corrected under CEQA before taking steps to adopt new CEQA documents.  This procedural requirement could be helpful to the extent it provides clarity for the corrections, but could also lead to significant delays in undertaking corrective actions by the local agency and may result in a new round of litigation with project opponents challenging the agency’s proposed corrective measures.
  • The bill adds a new Section 21167(g) which authorizes tolling agreements to extend the statute of limitations when agreed to by the public agency, the “party asserting noncompliance” with CEQA and the real party in interest (normally the project applicant).  At least one case has already held that the CEQA statute (without S.B. 731) authorized tolling agreements, but this proposed amendment provides additional confirmation of the court’s decision.  The new language of this bill may also amend CEQA so that a tolling agreement with one party extends the statute of limitations for any opponent, but the language of the bill is not clear on this point.
  • A new office of “Advisor on Renewable Energy Facilities” is created in the office of the Governor.  The legislation does not specify the authority of this office, and no changes are made to CEQA’s applicability to renewable energy facility projects.
  • The bill adds a new section, Public Resources Code Section 21080(h), stating that a project applicant for a renewable energy project may present to a public agency “the benefits onsite or offsite of the project, including, but not limited to measures that will mitigate greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the project”.  While this is something that most project applicants are already doing under existing CEQA provisions, there have been reports that some public agencies were not allowing project applicants to include these project environmental benefits in the CEQA analysis for renewable projects.  While the additional language in S.B. 731 does not mandate how public agencies should treat the information submitted by project applicants, it may be read as additional support for including these benefits in the CEQA analysis.

As the Legislature considers S.B. 731 this week and in the next several months, more information about S.B. 731 should become available, and further amendments may be made by the bill’s sponsor or the Legislature.

The Council on Environmental Quality Releases Handbooks Intended to Streamline NEPA Reviews with NHPA and CEQA Reviews

By Janice Schneider, Andrea Hogan, and Adam Thomas

On March 5, 2013, the Council on Environmental Quality released two handbooks designed to streamline the review process under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) — one focuses on coordination between NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), and the other on NEPA and the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).  Each handbook emphasizes ways to reduce duplication of effort in fulfilling legal requirements, thus increasing the efficiency of environmental reviews.

The NHPA/NEPA handbook was jointly released with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), the agency that oversees implementation of the Section 106 process under the NHPA.  While early integration of NHPA requirements into the NEPA process is a clear theme of the handbook, the handbook provides roadmaps for two different ways in which the NHPA and NEPA can be integrated to increase efficiency and avoid delay.  The first roadmap describes how reviews under the two laws can be better coordinated, while the processes under each are still independently followed.  The second roadmap focuses on the lesser-used substitution of NEPA’s proceedings to fulfill NHPA’s Section 106 review, in specific contexts.[1]  The concepts in the handbook are not new in the sense that they are based on existing regulations allowing for the alignment of NHPA and NEPA review.  But the development of the handbook and the inclusion of roadmaps and tips providing a clear path forward under either a coordination or substitution approach serve as an excellent reminder of ways to reduce the time and effort needed to complete environmental review for projects, while maximizing public and stakeholder input.

The CEQA/NEPA handbook was released in conjunction with the California Governor’s Office of Planning and Research and is open for public comment for 45 days (through April 19, 2013).  The handbook builds on provisions in both CEQA and NEPA that encourage joint federal and state review by providing practical suggestions for the development of a single environmental review process that would meet both CEQA and NEPA.  The handbook is clear that its suggestions are just that, and are not prescriptive.  Thus the impact of the handbook will depend on agencies’ willingness to follow the “opportunities for coordination” outlined in the handbook.  The handbook also includes guidance on drafting a Memorandum of Understanding, including sample text, that are typically entered into between agencies involved in a joint NEPA/CEQA review in order to establish a common understanding of the project and the review, by defining roles and responsibilities and establishing a process for collaboration.

Collectively, these two handbooks are excellent tools for project proponents interested in cutting the time and cost of review processes for renewable and other energy projects.  Project proponents should advocate for streamlining of their projects, allowing them to proceed more quickly through review and towards actual implementation, consistent with applicable law.


[1]  See 36 C.F.R. Section 800.8(c).  Substitution, however, does not relieve an agency of its Section 106 responsibility to resolve adverse effects to historic properties through consultation.  Per the handbook, where there are adverse effects to a historic property and the agency is drafting an Environmental Impact Statement, the agency may document resolution of adverse effects in the Record of Decision (it may also choose to develop a Memorandum of Agreement or Programmatic Agreement).  In contrast, when the agency is drafting an Environmental Assessment and adverse effects exist, the agency will still need to develop a Memorandum of Agreement or a Programmatic Agreement.  See CEQ and ACHP, NEPA and NHPA: A Handbook for Integrating NEPA and Section 106 at 30, 32-33 (Mar. 2013).

California Energy Commission Releases Proposed Rules Allowing Biomethane to Qualify for the Renewables Portfolio Standards

By Marc Campopiano and Tim Henderson

On March 11, 2013, the California Energy Commission (CEC) released a proposed Seventh Edition of the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) Eligibility Guidebook (proposed Guidebook).  As we discussed in a previous blog entry, on March 28, 2012, the CEC suspended the RPS eligibility of power plants generating electricity using biomethane. 

In response to the passage of AB 2196, which created a pathway for using biomethane to generate RPS-eligible electricity, the proposed Guidebook would lift the biomethane suspension and, among other changes, establish detailed procedures for certifying the RPS eligibility of electricity generated from biomethane.  The proposed changes would allow RPS-eligible electricity from both existing and new facilitates using biomethane provided the new requirements are met.  For example, for new facilities using biomethane delivered by a common-carrier pipeline, the facility must demonstrate that the biomethane flows from the injection point towards the facility and the biomethane capture and injection results in environmental benefits in California. 

In addition to the changes related to biomethane, the proposed Guidebook makes other notable changes to the RPS rules, including:

  •  Clarifying the RPS eligibility requirements for other renewable resources, including biomass and geothermal facilities.
  • Revising the conditions for facilities using nonrenewable fuel above the de minimis threshold to count the facility’s generation towards the RPS.
  • Establishing procedures for storing renewable electricity to produce future renewable energy credits (RECs).
  • Modifying the requirements for the types of facilities that may be RPS-certified, including adding limitations on facilities serving POUs.
  • Revising the process for tracking RPS compliance, including with respect to the retirement and reporting of the use of RECs.   
  • Clarifying the roles of the CEC and CPUC in implementing the RPS program, especially with respect to the portfolio content categories under SBX1-2.

The CEC held a public workshop on the proposed revisions on March 14, 2013, and is accepting comments until March 25, 2013.  A final draft Guidebook is expected in late April 2013. 

Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project Also Survives Challenge to the Project's Scientific Studies

By Taiga Takahashi

In previous commentary, we have noted the importance of a well-developed administrative record in project approval in risk management, controlling the potential for delay, and in project-related litigation. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California recently affirmed this general principle in rejecting a broad-based challenge by an environmental group and a labor union (the “Plaintiffs”) in Desert Protective Council v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 12cv1281-GPC(PCL) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013).[1]

The Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project (the “Project”) were based on the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”).[2] In short, the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit sought “to seek an order from the Court requiring BLM to avoid the killing of any raptor or owl from the Project” by challenging the availability and integrity of the scientific studies that supported BLM’s decision to grant the right-of-way for the Project. Id.

Successfully challenging a project approval against a properly managed administrative record is difficult. The Plaintiffs argued, for example, that BLM “misappl[ied] raptor use numbers drawn from critical raptor studies[,]” used the wrong time period in calculating the baseline numbers of the Swainson’s Hawk, and failed to take a “hard look” at and sufficiently specify conditions of approval and mitigation measures (such as curtailment) that would prevent the killing of owls and raptors, among other things.

The court rejected each of the Plaintiffs’ arguments. First, as is often the case in APA record review cases, the court deferred to the agencies’ application of scientific methodology.  Specifically, it found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that agencies’ conclusion that raptor use in the area was low was scientifically unsound; the court also found that plaintiffs’ arguments related to the Swainson’s Hawk amounted to nothing more than a dispute between experts. In such circumstances, the court found that an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts.  Finally, with respect to the Plaintiffs’ argument that project curtailment was required to protect owls and other raptors, the court explained that NEPA “does not require a substantive result, but only requires that mitigation is discussed in sufficient detail.” The court therefore concluded that the record provided sufficient detail as to the mitigation measures for other protected raptors and owls, thereby satisfying the requirements of NEPA and the FLPMA.

The Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project began commercial operation in December 2012 and is already transmitting renewable wind energy to the Sunrise Powerlink, where major construction activities completed in June 2012.


[1] The court also rejected the Quechan Tribe’s separate challenge on National Historic Preservation Act, NEPA, and FLPMA grounds in the companion case Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 12cv1167-GPC(PCL)(S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013), as discussed by Janice M. Schneider & Andrea Hogan, Court Strikes Down Quechan Tribe’s Challenges to the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project, Clean Energy Law Report (Mar. 19, 2013), on this blog.

[2] The plaintiffs did not pursue the BGEPA challenge and other previously raised NEPA claims on summary judgment, and the court therefore held that these claims were forfeited. See Desert Protective Council, supra, No. 12cv1281-GPC(PCL).

Court Strikes Down Quechan Tribe's Challenges to the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project

By Janice M. Schneider and Andrea M. Hogan

On February 27, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California rejected the Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation’s (“Quechan Tribe”) suit challenging the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project (the “Project”), a wind energy project in the Sonoran Desert in California.  See Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Department of Interior, et al., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27069 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013).  The Quechan Tribe alleged that BLM’s approval of a Record of Decision (“ROD”) allowing an approximately 10,000 acre right-of-way over federal land for the construction of 112 wind turbines, violated the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), among other laws.

The Quechan Tribe’s NHPA claim alleged that BLM (1) failed to adequately identify all the historic properties prior to ROD approval, and (2) failed to adequately consult the Tribe.  As to the first argument, the court found based on the administrative record that archaeological surveys were conducted in the area of direct impact, including the wind turbine construction areas, and that tribal monitors were invited to participate and did participate in the surveys.  Id. at *14-19.  The court also rejected the Quechan Tribe’s failure to consult claim and found instead that “the administrative record reveals many attempts, starting regularly in 2010, were made by BLM to engage the Tribe in Section 106 government to government consultation.”  Id. at *5.  This case stands in sharp contrast to the Quechan Tribe’s successful challenge against the Imperial Valley solar project,[1] where that project was enjoined based upon the Tribe’s argument that the BLM failed to adequately consult with it.  This new decision is instructive in that it details the process by which tribal participation occurred and was documented by the environmental consultants handling the cultural resources work, as well as the degree of oversight provided by BLM.  Id. at *12-19; see also id. at *19-27 (documenting the Section 106 process and distinguishing Quechan I). 

The Tribe’s FLPMA claims alleged that the Project does not comply with the Class L (limited use) designation included in the California Desert Conservation Area (“CDCA”) Plan, violates the Visual Resource Management (“VRM”) standards and will result in the unnecessary and undue degradation of public lands.  Id. at *27-48.  Again, the court rejected these claims finding that the Tribe did not demonstrate that the Project will “significantly diminish” sensitive resources values, pointing to the mitigation measures in the ROD, a reduction in the number of turbines authorized (from 155 proposed to 112 approved) and the small footprint of the project.  Id. at *28-35.  The court further found that BLM’s decision to change the VRM class from interim Class III (in which the level of change to the characteristic landscape should be moderate) to a final interim Class IV (in which the level of change to the characteristic landscape can be high) in the final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was not arbitrary or capricious because the prior designation was interim and could be changed.  The court also held that BLM’s conclusion that the Project would not result in the unnecessary or unduly degradation of public lands was not arbitrary and capricious, particularly in light of the ROD’s numerous mitigation measures.  Id. at *35-48. 

Finally, the court rejected the Tribe’s NEPA claim that BLM was required to analyze six “priority” renewable energy projects planned for the CDCA in a single EIS because under the “independent utility” test the Tribe failed to show how all of the projects were connected.  Id. at *50-53.  The court similarly rejected the Quechan Tribe’s other NEPA claims, finding that BLM’s cumulative impacts  and growth inducing effects analyses were not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and that the BLM adequately analyzed the Project’s consistency with local laws.  Id. at *54-68. 


[1]  Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (Quechan I).

California Appellate Court Signals that Adoption of Low Carbon Fuel Standard May Have Violated CEQA

By Michael Dreibelbis, Eli Hopson, and Aron Potash

A California appellate court signaled on February 26, 2013, that it might find that California’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) was improperly adopted.  The court sent a request for supplemental briefing in POET, LLC et al. v. Goldstene, et al. indicating that the California Air Resources Board (CARB) may have violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in adopting the LCFS.  Although the court has not yet issued its decision, if the court were to find that CARB violated CEQA, the court could suspend the LCFS until the violation is remedied.

This would not be the first time that CEQA, which requires state and local agencies to analyze and mitigate the environmental impacts of their projects, has been a roadblock to implementation of California’s climate change laws.  In 2011, a court found that CARB failed to comply with CEQA in approving the scoping plan which serves as a map for implementing California’s landmark climate change law.  The court enjoined California’s greenhouse gas cap and trade rulemaking pending the performance of an updated CEQA analysis.  Shortly following the court’s ruling, CARB delayed by a year the start of compliance obligations under the cap and trade program.

The LCFS requires fuel suppliers to reduce the carbon intensity of certain fuels to 10 percent below 2010 levels by 2020.  The ethanol company POET challenged the LCFS on CEQA grounds in 2009.  POET alleged that the CEQA process associated with CARB’s LCFS rulemaking failed to disclose significant environmental impacts, evaluate alternatives, and follow CEQA’s procedural rules, among other deficiencies.  The Fresno County Superior Court ruled against POET in November 2011, and POET appealed. 

In the recent request for supplemental briefing, the appellate court asked the parties to assume that CARB violated CEQA by:

  1. Approving the LCFS before environmental review was completed;
  2. Separating the authority to approve the LCFS from the responsibility for completing environmental review;
  3. Deferring the formulation of mitigation measures for NOx emissions from increased biodiesel use; and
  4. Omitting documents from the rulemaking file.

The request also instructed the parties to assume that the court will not declare the LCFS invalid but instead issue a writ of mandate specifying the actions CARB would need to take to bring the adoption of the LCFS into compliance with CEQA. 

Having set forth the assumptions above, the court requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing whether the LCFS should remain in effect while CARB takes any required corrective actions to remedy the alleged CEQA violations.  The court also asks the parties to discuss what the specific terms of any writ of mandate should be (i.e., what CARB should be required to do to bring its adoption of the LCFS and formulation of the NOx mitigation measures into compliance with CEQA).

The court set a briefing deadline of March 18 for POET and April 2 for CARB.  The court may also ask the parties to present oral argument prior to ruling on the matter.  Based on the assumptions incorporated into the court’s request for supplemental briefing, it appears likely but not certain that the court will decide that the LCFS adoption process violated CEQA.  What is less clear is exactly how the court might require CARB to remedy the alleged deficiencies, and whether parts or the entirety of the LCFS would be enjoined while CARB remedies the alleged deficiencies (which could take a month or longer).  Presumably, CARB is already working to update the CEQA documents in the event they are found deficient.   

In the meantime, the LCFS faces a challenge in federal court.  In December 2011, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the LCFS violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  The court further granted a preliminary injunction that prohibits enforcement of the LCFS until the conclusion of the litigation, which the Ninth Circuit stayed upon CARB’s appeal.  The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in October 2012 but has not yet issued a decision. 

Federal Government Approves Designation of Renewable Energy Development Areas in Arizona

By Anne B. Beaumont 

On January 18, 2013, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced the approval of Arizona’s Restoration Design Energy Project (RDEP), a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) initiative to identify public lands in Arizona that may be suitable for renewable energy development.

The RDEP Record of Decision (ROD)[1] establishes 192,100 acres of renewable energy development areas (REDAs) on BLM lands across Arizona. These REDAs are available for solar or wind energy development and are close to areas with high electricity demand (such as population centers and industrial areas). They are also located near transmission lines or designated corridors. The identified lands include previously disturbed sites (such as retired agricultural lands and landfills) and consist of areas with low resource sensitivity and few environmental conflicts. Consequently, they are unlikely to contain resources protected by statute or policy. As part of its environmental analysis, the BLM eliminated from consideration lands that contain sensitive resources requiring protection.

The ROD also establishes the Agua Caliente Solar Energy Zone (SEZ), located on 2,550 acres in western Arizona. This is the eighteenth SEZ in the nation and the third in Arizona. The other seventeen SEZs were previously identified in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Solar Energy Development in Six Southwestern States (Final Solar PEIS). Approved in October 2012, the Final Solar PEIS established the concept of SEZs as potential sites for utility-scale solar development. [2]

The Final Environmental Impact Statement for the RDEP evaluated six action alternatives. Alternative 6 (titled the Collaborative-Based Alternative) combined the themes looked at individually in Alternatives 1 through 5 into one overarching alternative. This Collaborative-Based Alternative—which incorporated all of the concepts, issues, and protections from the other five alternatives—is the BLM’s environmentally preferred alternative.

In identifying the REDAs and SEZ, the RDEP does not eliminate the need for further environmental review of individual sites and proposed projects within those areas. In addition, proposed renewable energy projects outside of a REDA or SEZ will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the Final Solar PEIS.


[1] The ROD and Approved Resource Management Plan Amendments (RMPA) were released on January 18, 2013, and are available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/az/pdfs/energy/rdep.Par.61787.File.dat/RDEP-ROD-ARMP.pdf.

[2] For more on the Final Solar PEIS, see our previous blog entry and related Client Alert, available at http://www.cleanenergylawreport.com/environmental-and-approvals/federal-government-issues-record-of-decision-approving-programmatic-environmental-impact-statement-f/. Recently, three environmental organizations—Western Lands Project, Desert Protective Council and Western Watersheds Project—have filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of the Interior challenging the program.

U.S. Navy Steams Full Speed Ahead with Renewable Energy Development on Military Lands

By Taiga Takahashi

In previous commentary, we discussed the opening of Department of Defense lands to renewable energy development, as well as some of the difficulties that may be encountered in developing on or near military lands. Notwithstanding technical and national security considerations, renewable energy development on or near Department of Defense lands appears to be steaming full speed ahead.

The Department of the Navy recently entered into its second memorandum of agreement this year to develop renewable wind energy near Naval Air Station Kingsville, bringing the total number of wind turbines proposed to be constructed in the area to over 180. The Riviera I wind project MOA and the Petronila wind project MOA   provide a useful template for developers who are contemplating development on Department of Defense lands. The MOAs contain the following similarities:

  • A provision for funding of mitigation measures related to wind turbine operations and compatibility, along with specification of various mitigation measures
  • Agreement to participate in a working group composed of Navy officials, wind energy developers, and other stakeholders, including state and local government officials
  • Agreement by the DoD and Navy not to object to the project
  • Provisions regarding curtailment of wind turbine operations
  • Provisional identification of specific locations of wind turbines

DoD’s support for renewable energy is widely recognized as a national security imperative and provides substantial opportunities for growth in terms of alternative forms of fuel and energy generation. But there are currently no requirements for “formal or enforceable early notification” to military bases that may be impacted by renewable energy development, but due to some siting problems, some military officials have asked Congress to require the involvement of nearby base officials in the planning process.[1] Given the unique technical and national security considerations that will be involved in many projects developed on or near Defense lands, developers should consider voluntarily consulting with DoD relatively early in the development process.[2]


[1]  The Riviera I wind project MOA was described as an “historic” agreement.

[2]  See our list of resources regarding siting renewable energy projects on or near military lands, which we provided in an earlier post.

WEBCAST - AB32 Update: Auction Lawsuit

Please join us today (Wednesday, November 14) at 11:30am pacific/1:30 pm eastern for a discussion of the lawsuit filed on Tuesday, November 13, by the California Chamber of Commerce seeking to invalidate ARB’s auction of allowances under AB32. There will be an opportunity for participants to submit questions via the webcast. 

Speakers
Jean-Philippe Brisson, New York
Claudia O’Brien, Washington, D.C
Michael Romey, Los Angeles

Click here to register for the webcast.

Expansive Interpretation of Strict Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act Takes Flight to the Fifth Circuit

By Buck B. Endemann and Taiga Takahashi

In a previous report, we discussed United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.,[1] where the court dismissed several misdemeanor charges under the MBTA against three oil and gas companies that conducted drilling operations in North Dakota, because the underlying activities were lawful, commercial activities. In United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., however, a district court in Texas recently distinguished Brigham Oil and denied a motion to dismiss a conviction under the MBTA.[2] Noting that the defendant was “aware that [protected birds were dying in its oil tanks] for years and did nothing to stop it” and the defendant’s activities were otherwise violating the Clean Air Act, the CITGO court followed the Tenth Circuit’s broader “proximate cause” requirement for imposing MBTA strict liability — i.e., a violation of the MBTA exists when the death of a migratory bird is a “reasonably anticipated or foreseeable consequence of” the underlying activity or the defendant otherwise had notice of the impropriety of the conduct at issue[3] —  and affirmed the conviction. In doing so, the CITGO court broke from its sister court’s opinion in United States v. Chevron[4] and injected further uncertainty regarding the application of the MBTA, not only in the Fifth Circuit but also across the United States.


 

[1]  840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).

[2]  2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125996, 2012 WL 3866857 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012).

[3]  See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] strict liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct charged here [— migratory birds becoming trapped and dying in oil drilling equipment —] satisfies due process only if defendants proximately cause the harm to protected birds”).

[4]  2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102682, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009). In Chevron, the court expressly declined to follow the Tenth Circuit’s proximate cause reasoning, refusing to accept a guilty plea for a violation of the MBTA based on the defendant’s failure to cover an oil well caisson, which resulted in the deaths of migratory birds.

 

Ninth Circuit Vacates Ruby Pipeline "No Jeopardy" Biological Opinion Under the Endangered Species Act

By Janice Schneider, Buck Endemann, and Jennifer Roy

On October 22, 2012, the Ninth Circuit vacated certain federal authorizations for the Ruby Pipeline, a completed natural gas pipeline running from Wyoming to Oregon.  The Court concluded that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (Service) Biological Opinion (BiOp) failed to comply with the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).[1]  The Court also found that the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Record of Decision (ROD) relying on the BiOp was therefore arbitrary and capricious.[2]  The court vacated the BiOp and ROD and remanded each document to its respective agency for further consideration.[3]

The ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of designated critical habitat.[4]  Ruby Pipeline L.L.C. (Ruby) obtained a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizing construction of the pipeline, the transport and sale of natural gas, and certain cost recovery.[5]  Pursuant to the ESA, FERC consulted with the Service on the pipeline’s effects on listed species.[6]  ESA regulations require the Service to formulate an opinion “as to whether the action, taken together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize” listed species.[7]  The Service ultimately issued a BiOp concluding that the pipeline was not likely to jeopardize nine species of endangered fish or their critical habitat.[8] 

In making the “no jeopardy” determination, the BiOp relied in part on a “Conservation Action Plan” (CAP) agreed to between Ruby and FERC that included measures for the protection of endangered species.[9]  While the CAP was not included as part of FERC’s “proposed action” (i.e., it was not described as part of the proposed pipeline project), the BiOp considered the CAP measures as “cumulative effects,” or “effects of future [non-Federal] activities… that are reasonably certain to occur . . . .”[10]  Relying on the CAP’s beneficial cumulative effects, the Service determined that the Ruby Pipeline would not likely jeopardize endangered fish, although the CAP was ostensibly a separate effort from the proposed pipeline project.[11] 

Under these facts, the panel held that the BiOp’s “no jeopardy” determination was flawed.[12]  According to the court, the CAP did not meet the criteria for background “cumulative effects,” because the CAP measures and the pipeline construction were “unequivocally interrelated.” [13]  For instance, FERC conditioned its approval in the CPCN on Ruby’s fulfillment of the CAP’s obligations; similarly, the conservation measures were dependent upon approval of the project.[14]  The court characterized this as a “quid-pro-quo” relationship that could not be appropriately characterized as a future non-federal cumulative action.[15]

Additionally, the panel held that under these circumstances, a conservation agreement promising to address project impacts on endangered species must be described as part of the proposed project, not merely a background consideration, to be properly considered in a BiOp’s jeopardy determination.[16]  The panel found that only mitigation measures in a proposed project or otherwise incorporated into the Service’s incidental take statement are fully enforceable under the ESA.[17]  Although FERC and BLM may have been able to enforce the CAP under their respective conditions of approval, the court found significant the Service’s special and primary role in protecting endangered species.[18]  The panel found that unless a mitigation agreement is binding under the ESA, the Service cannot effectively enforce the act by reinitiating consultation, levying “strict civil and criminal penalties,” and ESA citizen suits would likewise not be available to encourage enforcement with the measures.[19]  The potential for discretionary enforcement by other federal agencies (whose regulations may require them to balance competing, non-species concerns) was deemed to be inadequate by the Court.[20]

Ultimately, the court vacated the BiOp and ROD, and remanded both documents to the Service and BLM, respectively.[21]  While a revised BiOp is required under the Court’s order, it remains to be seen how the federal agencies will address this decision, especially because the pipeline has already been constructed, and the Court’s opinion did not on its face appear to affect the project’s BLM right-of-way or FERC approval.[22]  The parties have 45 days to seek a rehearing of the court’s decision.[23]


[1]  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.

[2]  Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt, 2012 WL 5193100 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2012) at *14.

[3] Id. at *24.

[4] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 

[5] 15 U.S.C. §717f(c); Order Issuing Certificate and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Requests for Rehearing and Clarification, 131 FERC ¶ 61,007 (April 5, 2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100405150436-CP09-54-000.pdf.

[6]   See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g); Center for Biological Diversity, 2012 WL 5193100 at *3.

[7]   50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). 

[8]   Center for Biological Diversity, 2012 WL 5193100 at *4.

[9]   Id.

[10] 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 

[11] Id. at *7.

[12] Id. at *4.

[13] Id. at *13.

[14] Id. at *6, *13.

[15] Id. at *13. The court also concluded that these particular CAP mitigation measures were “vague and distant-in-time” and thus would have likely been inadequate under the ESA.  Center for Biological Diversity, 2012 WL 5193100 at *14.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at *12.

[18] Id. at *4.

[19] Id. at *4, *12.

[20] Id. at *12.

[21] Id. at *24.  The court also held that the BiOp failed to adequately discuss potential impacts of groundwater withdrawals on listed species; that the Service’s reliance on an earlier BiOp when calculating incidental fish take levels was reasonable; and that the Service’s method of quantifying incidental take levels was not arbitrary and capricious.

[22] FERC’s CPCN was not challenged in the litigation.

[23] Fed. R. App. P. 40. 

Federal Government Issues Record of Decision Approving Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Solar Energy Development in Six Southwestern States

By Laura A. Godfrey, Janice M. Schneider and Anne B. Beaumont

Latham & Watkins has issued a Client Alert regarding the Record of Decision approving the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Solar Energy Development in Six Southwestern States.” With the signing of the Record of Decision on October 12, 2012, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) adopted a comprehensive Solar Energy Program to administer the development of utility-scale solar energy resources on BLM-administered lands in six southwestern states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. Utility-scale solar energy development is defined as facilities with generating capacities typically 20 megawatts or greater.  The program’s purpose is to identify locations on BLM lands that are most suitable for utility-scale solar energy development. These areas are characterized by excellent solar resources, access to existing or planned transmission, and relatively low impact to biological, cultural, and historic resources. The program also seeks to allow the permitting of future projects on public lands to proceed in a more efficient, standardized, and environmentally responsible manner.

The Solar Energy Program attempts to concentrate solar development into an initial set of seventeen Solar Energy Zones (SEZs) located on 285,000 acres of public lands across six southwestern states. The SEZs will serve as priority areas for utility-scale solar development. The program provides incentives for solar development within these zones, including faster and easier permitting and improved mitigation strategies, as well as economic incentives.  In addition to the established SEZs, the program outlines a process for the proposal of new and expanded SEZs by industry, the public, and other interested stakeholders and also creates a variance process allowing for development of well-sited projects on approximately 19 million acres outside of the zones. At the same time, it excludes some 78.6 million acres from solar energy development.

The Client Alert discusses the background and key elements of the Final Solar Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, as well as its potential implications for solar development in the Western United States.  To view this Client Alert as a PDF, please click here.

Court of Appeal Decision Highlights Importance of Risk Management in Administrative Proceedings

By Damon P. Mamalakis and Taiga Takahashi

In September 2012, the Court of Appeal in Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Center v. County of Siskiyou affirmed the approval of a 15 MW biomass-fueled cogeneration plant in northern California.[1]  This case is the first published state court opinion regarding a challenge to the approval of a biomass energy project in California.

At the core of the lawsuit was the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), with challenges to the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and its analysis regarding alternatives, air quality, noise, and water resource impacts, among others.[2]  The case highlights the importance of managing risk throughout the administrative approval process, specifically in developing a thorough, well-documented EIR that allows for informed decision making.  In doing so, project applicants may enjoy the protection of a relatively high degree of deference in judicial review, even where the EIR has some errors (as CEQA does not require perfection, but rather informed decision making), and can thereby help control the likelihood of surviving a challenge in court.

For a more complete discussion of the Mount Shasta case, please see our client alert. The Mount Shasta opinion is available here.


[1] No. C064930 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2012) (ordered published Oct. 18, 2012).

[2] In the Superior Court, the petitioners also challenged the analysis regarding other environmental impacts, including climate change, aesthetic and visual resources, traffic, and geology and soils.  Memorandum of Decision, Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Ctr. v. County of Siskiyou, No. SC CV PT 08 8144 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010).  The Superior Court’s judgment on these claims was not a part of the appeal.  See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Ctr. v. County of Siskiyou, No. C064930 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2010).  In a related lawsuit, petitioners challenged the Siskiyou County Air Pollution Control District’s determination of best available control technology for the project and brought other claims based on alleged violations of procedural due process.  Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Ctr. v. Siskiyou County Air Pollution Control Dist., No. SC CV PT 09 0933 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 2009).  The Superior Court also rejected this challenge, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in an unpublished opinion.  Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Ctr. v. Siskiyou County Air Pollution Control Dist., No. SC CV PT 09 0933 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 4, 2010), aff’d, No. C065668 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2012).

California Energy Commission Clarifies Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) Eligibility Requirements

By Marc T. Campopiano and Tim B. Henderson

On August 9, 2012, the California Energy Commission (CEC) adopted a revised Sixth Edition of the Renewables Portfolio Standard Eligibility Guidebook (RPS Guidebook) to clarify changes to the RPS Guidebook Fifth Edition, which was recently adopted on May 9, 2012, as described in our prior blog discussion.  Highlights of the changes include the following:

  • The CEC clarified additional RPS requirements for generating facilities with a first point of interconnection to the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) electrical grid outside of California to a non-California Balancing Authority.  Most notably, these “out-of-state” facilities must demonstrate that they will not cause or contribute to a violation of California’s environmental laws or regulations.  In addition, generating facilities located outside of the United States must demonstrate that the facility’s development and operation will be “as protective of the environment as a similar facility in California.”  Local publicly owned electric utilities (POUs) and multi-jurisdictional utilities can be exempted from the additional rules if they meet certain criteria.
  • The CEC changed certain requirements for “aggregated” facilities such as small-scale, distributed generation photovoltaic (PV) solar facilities that are grouped together for purposes of RPS eligibility.  In particular, if a sub-facility within the aggregated facility becomes ineligible for the RPS, the aggregated facility may be able to maintain its RPS certification by submitting an amended application to remove the ineligible sub-facility. 
  • The CEC refined several rules regarding the date on which a generating facility is deemed to begin operations, which can affect what RPS eligibility criteria apply.  The RPS Guidebook now requires repowered facilities seeking to change their start date to apply for RPS certification as a repowered facility.  Additionally, certification applications must be submitted within 90 days of the start of operations at the repowered facility in order to secure eligibility for resources generated in the month the facility applied for certification. 
  • The update now provides that utility-certified facilities must apply for certification within 90 days of termination of a utility contract.

Department of Defense and Department of Interior Open 16 Million Acres of Federal Lands to Renewable Energy Projects

By Janice Schneider, Laura A. Godfrey, Buck Endemann and Taiga Takahashi

Earlier this year, the Navy, Army, and Air Force committed to deploy three gigawatts total of renewable energy on service installations by 2025. In late July, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and the Department of Defense (“DOD”) took the first steps to implement this policy by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) aimed to facilitate the federal government’s goals of increasing renewable energy generation from federal lands and the Outer Continental Shelf.

The MOU establishes three programs for developing appropriate, mission-compatible renewable energy near military installations or on public lands withdrawn for military purposes.

One program is an Installation Renewable Energy Partnership Plan (“Installation Partnership Plan”) for siting projects on or near DOD installations[1] to provide power for the military and excess power to the grid. This plan identified six DOD installations to serve as pilots in an interagency process to authorize solar energy projects in California[2] and Arizona.[3] This plan also calls for the identification of areas on withdrawn lands for other types of renewable energy development.[4] The Installation Partnership Plan adds to other service-specific renewable energy development programs already in progress, such as the U.S. Army’s recent $7 billion Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for renewable and alternative energy.[5]

Another program introduced by the MOU is an Offshore Wind Partnership Plan (“Offshore Wind Partnership”) near DOD coastal installations along the eastern seaboard, the Pacific coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and Hawaii. The Offshore Wind Partnership could result in potential project efficiencies, including security, land for a substation, and potential landing sites on coastal DOD installations. An offshore wind generator could also enter into an offtake contract with the military, which tends to have relatively consistent and predictable energy requirements.[6]

The final partnership program is the Alaska Initiative, which seeks to increase renewable energy generation in Alaska and will likely focus on wind, biomass, geothermal, and tidal and wave energy generation. In addition to federal installations, the Alaska Initiative would promote the development of small-scale renewable energy packages for off-grid, remote locations, including Native Alaskan villages.

Given these new federal initiatives, DOD installations—and in particular lands withdrawn from public lands for military purposes—present a substantial opportunity for renewable energy development. DOD installations encompass almost 30 million acres of land, 16 million of which were public lands formerly managed by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) before being withdrawn for military purposes and 13 million of which are high in solar, wind, and geothermal resources. Furthermore, the MOU directs the Interagency Land Use Coordinating Committee (“ILUCC”) [7] to seek legislative clarification on the real property and resource aspects of renewable energy projects on withdrawn lands.

Improved access to DOD installations and military customers presents a new opportunity for onshore and offshore renewable energy development. As the processes in the MOU unfold alongside other DOD policies[8]—and, in particular, as long as federal agencies continue to develop processes for agency land-use coordination through initiatives like the ILUCC—utility-scale renewable energy developers should find an increasing number of opportunities to engage in projects on military land or with military customers that will improve military readiness,  enhance national security, and provide other renewable energy benefits.

A map of DOD installations across the United States is provided here.


 

[1]  For example, the U.S. Army alone has potentially 5 million available acres.

[2]  Three sites are at Fort Irwin.

[3]  The other sites are at Barry M. Goldwater Range East and West and the Yuma Proving Ground.

[4]  Including, for example, a similar pilot process to develop a geothermal plant at a yet to be determined DOD installation.

[5]  This RFP will be available at http://go.usa.gov/Gd6 until 2 P.M. Central Standard Time on October 5, 2012.

[6]  There are some limits to the Offshore Wind Partnership. For example, the MOU explicitly notes that neither the DOI nor the DOD will directly develop a project or commit in advance to purchase power as an incentive for project financing. However, the DOI and DOD plan to hold a wind energy forum before October 1, 2012, among military, other federal agency, state, tribal, local, and industry stakeholders to share information regarding offshore wind projects.

[7]  The ILUCC currently addresses, at the undersecretary/deputy level, the development of renewable energy on lands withdrawn for defense-related purposes. The ILUCC consists of deputy-director level representatives from the DOI (including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and BLM), DOD (individual service components), and their respective legal counsel. A basic overview of DOI-DOD coordination efforts is available at www.smrconference.com/getfile.cfm?ID=135.

[8]  While the MOU is not the first action that DOD has taken to facilitate renewable energy development on or near military installations, the MOU is clearly consistent with forward-looking energy policy that emphasizes the relationship between military readiness, energy independence, and national security. Each service (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) has been developing special departments, policies, and tools focused on emissions reduction, renewable energy development, and energy efficiency and conservation. Links to some of the initiatives are collected below:

UPDATE: Forest Service Announces Proposed Rule and Request for Comments Regarding Project-Level Pre-Decisional Administrative Review Process

By Janice M. Schneider, Laura A. Godfrey and Taiga Takahashi

In early March, we discussed Section 428 of the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which directed the establishment of a pre-decisional objection process to replace the Forest Service post-decisional administrative appeals process under 36 C.F.R. part 215 for administrative appeals related to “projects and activities implementing land management plans and documented with a Record of Decision (ROD) or Decision Notice (DN)”. The Forest Service recently announced its proposed rule and is taking public comment on it until September 7, 2012.[1]

The proposed rule adds some previously missing detail that is generally consistent with what we had expected. For example, the Forest Service has proposed a 45-day objection period for a project or activity implementing a land management plan[2] and 30-day objection period for an authorized hazardous fuel reduction project.[3] The 45-day objection period is the same length as the time to appeal project decisions under the current post-decisional appeals process.[4] In addition, the proposed rule would replace only the appeals process under 36 C.F.R. pt. 215 and does not appear to affect appeals available to project applicants under 36 C.F.R. pt. 251[5] or appeals of forest plan adoptions or plan amendments themselves under 36 C.F.R. pt. 219.

In addition, the proposed rule makes clear that a project opponent would need to have filed comments on the proposed action during the public review process (such as the environmental review process under the National Environmental Policy Act), as well as a protest before a project opponent can be said to have exhausted administrative remedies and challenge the decision on the project in federal court.[6] Finally, the proposed rule also discusses how the Forest Service would provide public notice of the opportunity to file objections.[7] Taken together, the provisions of the proposed rule will require project opponents to participate in multiple stages of the review process in order to gain access to the federal courts.

The Federal Register notice is available in PDF at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-08/pdf/2012-19302.pdf and in HTML at https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-19302.


[1]  The Forest Service is taking public comment on the information collection requirements of the proposed rule until October 9, 2012.

[2]  Project-Level Pre-Decisional Administrative Review Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,337, 47,350 (proposed Aug. 8, 2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 218.26).

[3]  Id. (proposed to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 218.32).

[4]  Id. at 47,343.

[5]  Appeals under part 251, subpart C, provide a process “by which those who hold or, in certain instances, those who apply for written authorizations to occupy and use National Forest System lands, may appeal a written decision issued by an authorized Forest Service line officer.” 36 C.F.R. § 251.80.

[6]  77 Fed. Reg. at 47,348 (proposed to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 218.14) (“[A]ny filing for Federal judicial review of a decisions [sic] covered by these regulations is premature and inappropriate unless the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative review process set out in this part.”). See also 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,346 (proposed to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 218.5) (who may file objections).

[7]  Id. at 47,345 (proposed to be codified at 36 C.F.R. 218.2) (definition of “objection period”) (“The period following publication of the legal notice in the newspaper of record of an environmental assessment (30 calendar days) or final environmental impact statement (45 calendar days) for a proposed project or activity during which an objection may be filed with the reviewing officer. When the Chief is the responsible official the objection period begins following publication of a notice in the Federal Register.”).

California Energy Commission Updates Renewables Portfolio Standard Eligibility Guidebook

By Marc Campopiano and Tim Henderson

On May 9, 2012, the California Energy Commission (CEC) adopted a revised Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) Eligibility Guidebook.  The update implements several key modifications to the RPS eligibility criteria, including but not limited to:

  •  Incorporating changes required by Senate Bill X1-2, which raised the RPS to 33 percent by 2020.  Signed by Governor Brown on April 12, 2011, Senate Bill X1-2 made other significant revisions to the RPS, including covering publicly-owned utilities for the first time, changing renewable delivery requirements, and expediting permit review for renewable projects by the California Department of Fish and Game.  Senate Bill X1-2 represented a substantial new statutory requirement that will have significant ramifications on energy markets, electricity generation and transmission line development in California and throughout the western states. The California Public Utilities Commission has estimated that a 33 percent by 2020 RPS will require almost a tripling of renewable generation from 27 terawatt hours in 2009 to 75 terawatt hours in 2020, potentially necessitating $115 billion in new infrastructure investment including at least seven new major transmission lines at a cost of $12 billion.  For a more detailed discussion of Senate Bill X1-2, see the recent Latham & Watkins Client Alert.
  • Reflecting the recent suspension of biomethane as an RPS-eligible renewable fuel source.  The suspension is discussed further in a recent Latham & Watkins Client Alert
  • Limiting the amount of nonrenewable fuel that can be counted as renewable under the RPS. 
  • Allowing facilities serving onsite load (distributed generation) to be RPS-certified and generate renewable energy credits (RECs), as long as they meet all eligibility requirements for the specific renewable fuel source used at the facility. 
  • Allowing facilities serving publicly owned utilities to count resources generated since January 1, 2011, for RPS purposes, as long as they apply to the CEC for RPS certification by October 1, 2012. 

The CEC also adopted a revised Overall Program Guidebook, which describes requirements and information related to the RPS and broader renewable energy programs at the CEC.   

Brownfield Re-Development for Renewable Energy Projects and CERCLA Joint and Several Liability

By Taiga Takahashi

A popular concept in renewable-energy-project siting is the use of contaminated properties for potential projects.  EPA’s initiative, “RE-Powering America’s Land,” reflects the federal government’s encouragement of this concept.  But the use of contaminated land presents its own risks to developers, industry, property owners, and state and local governments.  Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”),[1] owners and operators of contaminated land may be held jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs related to the contamination at the site.  Accordingly, developing renewable energy projects on contaminated sites has unique risks—including potentially large and difficult-to-quantify cleanup costs.

With this in mind, a brief overview of the law of CERCLA joint and several liability is appropriate—and timely.  May 4 marked the three-year anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009).  This decision, which held that apportionment was proper whenever there is a “reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm[,]”[2] sent shockwaves[3] across the legal landscape and immediately provoked impassioned responses from the legal community.[4]  Some commentators broadly declared that joint and several liability under CERCLA was “dead”;[5] still others bemoaned the Court’s affirmation of “bad math[6] and predicted the demise of the role of science in apportionment analyses.[7]  But the three years after Burlington Northern have demonstrated that joint and several liability under CERCLA is alive and well.  An examination of lower court opinions since Burlington Northern reveals that many courts have not drastically changed analysis of joint and several liability since the Supreme Court’s apportionment holding, and defending against joint and several liability after Burlington Northern may only be marginally easier, if different at all.

Much of the controversy surrounding the apportionment holding stems from the Court’s endorsement, as reasonable, of what many commentators consider a rather crude and inaccurate methodology.[8]  Based on this methodology, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that joint and several liability did not apply, because apportionment of the harm was possible.[9]  Of additional note is the fact that the trial court in Burlington Northern undertook its analysis sua sponte—and the Supreme Court did not object—in what Justice Ginsburg described as a “heroic labor” where “[n]either party offered helpful arguments to apportion liability.”[10]

The district court’s apportionment methodology in Burlington Northern was relatively basic.  It involved three variables: (1) the percentage of surface area that the defendant Railroads owned, in relation to the entire contaminated site; (2) the length of time that the Railroads leased its property to an agricultural chemical distribution business; and (3) the percentage of contamination that this particular parcel of property was responsible for, in relation to the entire contaminated site.[11]  Percentage of surface area owned was 19%; length of time owned was 45%; and percentage of contamination contributed was 66%, or two-thirds.[12]  Multiplying these three variables together and adding a (somewhat arbitrary) 50% margin of error, the district court concluded that the Railroads’ liability was 9%.[13]

But district courts have not treated Burlington Northern as the sea change some commenters suggested it would be.  For example, the district court in Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Essay Co. was among the first courts to address Burlington Northern’s apportionment holding,[14] and its application of Burlington Northern was relatively circumscribed.  While acknowledging that Burlington Northern was a “watershed” apportionment case regarding “evidentiary” issues, [15] it downplayed the reach of the decision: “The Court's holding on apportionment was actually quite limited . . . [and it] was merely holding that the lower court could rightly consider such things as the physical surface areas of the damaged land, the length of time over which the pollution occurred, and the areas where the pollution was released.”[16]  This sentiment did not change in subsequent months, as many lower courts limited Burlington Northern to its facts, and in one case, characterized it as “simply reiterat[ing] the law.”[17]

Some courts have rejected simple analogies to Burlington Northern—that is, when the defendant seeks only to mirror Burlington Northern’s apportionment methodology by providing evidence of space, time, and contamination without providing evidence that supports the underlying assumptions that make these variables and methodology relevant.[18]  For example, some courts have required evidence that releases of contamination was steady over the time at issue or some evidence of how contamination migrated or dispersed over time before even considering a theory of divisibility based on percentage-of-time owned, which is similar to the methodology used in Burlington Northern.[19]  Even when a defendant makes relatively painstaking efforts to avoid joint and several liability by presenting multiple alternative methods for apportionment, the presumption of joint and several liability is difficult to overcome.[20]  Apportionment still carries a “heavy burden.”[21]

Renewable energy project developers should be aware of the risks involved in locating a project on a brownfield site—first to manage the risk of incurring liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA and second to be cognizant the risks that other stakeholders must face.  Although the EPA appears actively interested and engaged in the redevelopment of brownfields for renewable energy projects, developers should exercise particular caution when considering these sites.  Many brownfield cleanups remain complicated and expensive.  Even if the project developer is not liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA, it may be nonetheless involved substantively in the cleanup process.  While the project developer might not be directly dealing with these issues of joint and several liability, other critical stakeholders may be.  Notwithstanding the early reactions to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, the complex and often high-stakes cost apportionment issues involved in brownfields redevelopment remain little changed, and joint and several liability remains difficult to overcome.


[1]  Pub. L. 96–510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75).

[2]  Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 (2009).

[3]  See, e.g., John M. Barkett, Burlington Northern: The Super Quake and Its Aftershocks, Chemical Waste Litig. Rep.: Interim Rep. (May 15, 2009).

[4]  See Evansville Greenway & Remediation Trust v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 661 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1012 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“The full import of Burlington Northern is hotly debated, in this case and elsewhere.”).

[5]  See, e.g., Robert C. Cook, Superfund: Government Threat of 100 Percent Liability ‘Pretty Much Dead’ After Burlington Decision, 41 Bureau Nat’l Affairs Env’t Rep. 216 (Jan. 29, 2010).

[6]  See, e.g., Nicholas J. Houpt, Bad Math in CERCLA Apportionment: The Untold Tale of Burlington Northern, Columbia J. Envtl. L. Field Reps. (Oct. 17, 2010).  See also Walter Mugdan, The Burlington Court’s Flawed Arithmetic, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10637 (July 2010).

[7]  See, e.g., Mark R. Misiorowski & Joel D. Eagle, The Diminishing Role of Science in CERCLA After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe, 41 Bureau Nat’l Affairs Env’t Rep.1205 (May 22, 2009).

[8]  See, e.g., Michael K. Foy, From Chem-Dyne to Burlington Northern: Apportioning Cleanup Costs in the New Era of Joint and Several CERCLA Liability, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 625, 625–50 (2011).

[9]  See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 606, 619 (2009).

[10] Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

[11] Id. at 615 (Stevens, J., writing for the majority).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] No. 08-C-16, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111648 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2009).

[15] Id. at *9 (emphasis in original).

[16] Id. at *8–9.

[17] United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. 91-0768-JAM-JFM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44331, at *8 (May 6, 2010).  See also, e.g., Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. (PCS Nitrogen II), No. 2:05–cv–2782–MBS, 2011 WL 2119256, at *44 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court's approval of a fifty percent margin of error in the Burlington Northern case was fact-specific and did not indicate that a fifty percent margin of error will always be appropriate in apportionment calculations.”).

[18] See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47889, at *47–49 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2012); United Alloys, Inc. v. Baker, No. CV 93–4722 CBM (Ex), 2011 WL 2749641, at *21–22 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2011); United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10–C–910, 2011 WL 2634262, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Jul. 5, 2011); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown Groups Retail, Inc., No. 08-cv-00855-LTB-KMT, 2011 WL 816792, at *22–24 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2011); ITT Industries, Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 848, 877–81 (W.D. Mich. 2010); United States v. Saporito, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1061–62 (N.D. Ill. 2010); 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. RobertShaw Controls Co., No. CV 08-3985 PA (Ex), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138661, at *24–32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010); Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. (PCS Nitrogen I), No. 2:05-cv-2782-MBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104772, at *116–33 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2010).

[19] See, e.g., 3000 E. Imperial, No. CV 08-3985 PA (Ex), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138661, at *31–32; PCS Nitrogen I, No. 2:05-cv-2782-MBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104772, at *126–27.

[20] PCS Nitrogen II, No. 2:05–cv–2782–MBS, 2011 WL 2119256, at *43–48 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011) (rejecting five different methods for apportionment).

[21] Ashland Inc. v. GAR Electroforming, 729 F. Supp. 2d 526, 548 (D.R.I. 2010) (comparing the difference in the burden of proof between claims for section 107 apportionment and claims for section 113 apportionment).  Burlington Northern did not shift the burden of proof to plaintiff—joint and several liability remains the default rule.  See ITT Corp. v. Borg-Warner Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75637, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2009) (“The ultimate burden of proving divisibility is on the party invoking the doctrine.”).

EPA Introduces Interactive Web-Based Geographic Information System

By Taiga Takahashi

The U.S. EPA recently opened access to NEPAssist, an online Geographic Information System program that “facilitates the environmental review process and project planning in relation to environmental considerations” under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental assessment statutes. The program is available at the EPA website and is open to the public.

NEPAssist has the normal features of other publicly available web-based mapping services, such as nationwide street maps in two and three dimensions, in addition to aerial and satellite views.

Map overlays
NEPAssist draws environmental data from EPA and other government databases at the user’s request and provides an immediate overview of various environmental assessment indicators for a user-defined area of interest. These overlays include, for example:

  • EPA facilities, such as brownfields, Superfund sites, toxic release points, and hazardous waste sites;
  • Water monitoring stations;
  • Community points of interest, such as schools, churches, and hospitals;
  • Railroads and airports;
  • Water body features, such as impaired streams and water bodies under the Clean Water Act, aquifers, and watersheds;
  • Clean Air Act nonattainment areas for the ozone, lead, and annual and 24-hour particulate matter standards;
  • Borders of interest, such as zip codes, congressional districts, cities, towns, counties, states, federal lands, and EPA regions;
  • Demographic information;
  • Other important land-use information, such as wetlands areas, FEMA flood hazard designations, topographical overlays, and development and land cover overlays.

Built-in data analysis
NEPAssist offers a variety of other useful data analysis and comparison features.

  • Source data access: for certain information, the original source data or report is available instantly. For example, highlighting an impaired water body gives access to the original TMDL source report.
  • Drawing features and customized reports: the user can draw project boundaries, and NEPAssist will produce reports that will show distances to important points of interest for environmental planning, including distances to wetlands, Superfund sites, etc. as described above. These reports include state-specific requirements, as well as requirements pertaining to federal law.
  • Environmental Justice reports: NEPAssist also provides Environmental Justice reports. These reports compare project-specific demographic characteristics to County and national averages.

Example NEPAssist Report

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Limitations
NEPAssist is still a work in progress, but EPA is planning to revise and update it according to user feedback. Some limitations and plans for further development include:

  • Saving data: each time a user leaves the website and returns, he/she will have to redraw the study area.
  • Not all federal environmental data has been incorporated into NEPAssist, but EPA plans to supplement current data and add new data in the future.
    • More complete data: For example, wetlands information is available through NEPAssist, but it is incomplete. EPA is in the process of fully incorporating wetlands data into NEPAssist.
    • New data: ESA-related data (for example, presence of listed species, critical habitat, etc.) is not (yet) available through NEPAssist. EPA stated a desire to add this information in the future.

While still in the development stage, NEPAssist offers relatively easy and consolidated access to federal government environmental data. Planners, decision-makers, and the public should find NEPAssist to be a valuable and convenient tool in the environmental review process. 

Federal Court Rejects U.S. EPA's Decision to Invalidate Existing Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit

By Mia Robertshaw

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has removed a layer of uncertainty for Clean Water Act section 404 permits.  On March 23, 2012, the Court held that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded its authority by purporting to invalidate an existing section 404 dredge-and-fill permit.  Nearly three years after the permit was issued, in a move unprecedented in the history of the Clean Water Act, EPA purported to withdraw the specification of disposal sites, thereby invalidating the permit which authorized discharge of spoil at those sites.  In Mingo Logan Coal Company, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, the Court concluded that EPA’s asserted authority to unilaterally modify or revoke a duly issued permit is not conferred by the statute, and is contrary to the language, structure, and legislative history of section 404 as a whole.[1] 

Mingo Logan Coal Company, Inc. held a 404 permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in January 2007, after environmental review of Mingo Logan’s project.  The permit authorized Mingo Logan to discharge fill material from its coal mine into local water courses.  During the project approval process, EPA expressed concerns about potential adverse impacts of the project, but established that EPA intended to work with the Corps to address these concerns. 

Almost two years after the Corps issued the permit, EPA requested that the Corps suspend, revoke, or modify the permit because of downstream water quality impacts that EPA asserted the permit did not adequately address.  The Corps rejected the request, finding no grounds to suspend, revoke, or modify the permit.  In January 2011, EPA issued a Final Determination (links to PDF) to withdraw the specification of certain water courses as a disposal site for dredged or fill material in connection with the project. 

Section 404 allows the Corps to issue permits for discharges into navigable waters only at “specified” sites.  EPA may prohibit or restrict the specification of an area as a disposal site if EPA determines that the discharge will have certain unacceptable adverse environmental impacts.[2] 

Before issuing its Final Determination in this matter, EPA had never vetoed a section 404 permit after a permit had been issued in any matter.  Mingo Logan challenged EPA’s purported withdrawal of the specification of disposal sites.  The Court granted summary judgment in Mingo Logan’s favor, vacating the Final Determination. 

EPA maintained that section 404(c) authorized EPA to prohibit the use of certain disposal sites at any time.  The Court found this interpretation illogical and impractical, and found that “[i]t is further unreasonable to sow a lack of certainty into a system that was expressly intended to provide finality.”[3]  Thus, while EPA may veto the use of certain disposal sites, it must do so before the Corps issues the permit.

In Mingo Logan Coal Co., the Court rejected what could have been a significant source of uncertainty for Clean Water Act section 404 permits.  It is possible EPA will appeal the ruling, as several environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, Earthjustice, and regional Appalachian groups, urge.


[1]  Mingo Logan Coal Co., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39532. 
[2]  33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (“The [EPA] Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.  Before making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary [of the Army]”).
[3]  Mingo Logan Coal Co., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, supra at 58-59.

The California Energy Commission Abruptly Suspends Eligibility of Biomethane Under California's Renewables Portfolio Standard

By: Marc T. Campopiano

On March 28, 2012, the California Energy Commission voted unanimously to suspend the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) eligibility guidelines for certification of power plants generating electricity using biomethane.   In 2011, California’s Legislature passed Senate Bill X1-2 that raised the RPS to 33% by 2020, one of the most aggressive renewable energy mandates in the country.  The Commission asserted its decision was necessary to provide it “additional time to evaluate the RPS eligibility of biomethane as a result of Senate Bill X1-2.”

The Commission voted for the suspension after only a 10-day notice period.  Numerous representatives of the biogas industry, public utilities and investor-owned utilities submitted written comments and voiced concerns during a March 28 hearing that a suspension could devastate the industry and jeopardize millions of dollars of RPS-compliant contracts between utilities and biomethane suppliers.  While the Commission approved several last-minute revisions to address some of these concerns, the Commission adopted the suspension without delay.

To support its decision, the Commission cited potential concerns that renewable biomethane may not advance the “preference” of Senate Bill X1-2 “for electricity generation that provides more environmental benefits to the state by displacing in-state fossil fuel consumption, reducing air pollution within the state, and helping the state meet its climate change goals by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) associated with electrical generation.”  The Commission did not explain how Senate Bill X1-2 created this preference.  The Commission’s notice of the suspension included a supporting letter from four members of the Legislature but did not include letters from a number of other Legislators who opposed the suspension.

Prior to the suspension, the Commission’s RPS Eligibility Guidebook (4th ed., December 15, 2010) recognized the potential RPS-eligibility of landfill and digester gas that could be delivered as biomethane to a power plant using the existing natural gas pipeline system.  The power plant received RPS credit for generation attributable to biomethane instead of natural gas, provided that the power plant was certified by the Commission and met the RPS Eligibility Guidebook’s tracking and monitoring requirements.  RPS-eligible electricity from biomethane can provide important benefits by supporting baseload and peaking generation—which supports grid stability and the integration of intermittent renewable resources such as wind and solar—without typically requiring significant new transmission or infrastructure development.

U.S. Army Corps Reissues 48 Existing and Two New Nationwide Permits

By Janice Schneider, Laura Godfrey, Buck Endemann, Josh Bledsoe, and Jennifer Roy

On February 21, 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) reissued 48 of its 49 existing nationwide permits (NWP) and also announced two new NWPs applicable to land- and water-based renewable energy development projects.[1]  The Army Corps is issuing the NWPs pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which governs discharges into “waters of the United States,” including wetlands (jurisdictional waters).[2] 

The Army Corps requires a Section 404 permit when development activities discharge dredged or fill materials into jurisdictional waters, such as filling in a streambed to build an access road to a wind turbine.  The Army Corps has developed various NWPs designed to expedite approval of specific types of activities deemed to have minimal impacts.  To be eligible for a NWP authorization, a project must fit into a category for which a NWP already exists and typically impact less than one-quarter acre or one-half acre of jurisdictional waters (depending on the applicable NWP).

This month’s Army Corps announcement results in important changes that could impact already-approved projects or projects currently under review by federal and state agencies:

  • Grandfather provision: Activities that are authorized under existing NWPs that have commenced or are under contract to commence by March 18, 2012, will have until March 18, 2013, to complete the activity under the terms and conditions of the existing NWP.  Activities that will not be complete by March 18, 2013, must seek authorization under the new NWPs.
  • Definition of Single and Complete Project:  The Army Corps clarified what constitutes a single and complete project for purposes of calculating the relevant loss of waters of the United States.  For linear projects (projects constructed for the purpose of moving goods or services from A to B, such as transmission lines), the definition of a single and complete project has been clarified to mean the portion of the project that includes each crossing of a single waterbody at a specific location.  As such, there may be many “single and complete projects” along the length of a linear project.  In contrast, a single and complete non-linear project is generally defined as the entire project.[3]  For a portion of a non-linear project to be considered a separate single and complete project, it must have independent utility from other portions of the non-linear project.
  • General Condition 19:  The Army Corps included a new general condition, providing that a developer is responsible for applying and obtaining any appropriate permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service if any activities regulated by the Army Corps would result in the “take” of a migratory bird or bald or golden eagle.  Based on the Final Rule and comments, the general condition appears to only clarify that it is the responsibility of the permittee, not the Army Corps, to obtain the necessary permits. It does not appear to require such permits as a pre-requisite to the issuance of the authorization.  It will be important to monitor how this general condition is ultimately implemented.  Project developers should also be aware of Regional Conditions adopted by district engineers that can influence the applicability and operation of the NWPs.
  • New NWP 51:  NWP 51 applies to the construction, expansion, or modification of land-based renewable energy generation projects, including solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal projects.  Utility lines transporting renewable energy from the project may be separately authorized under NWP 12, and their maintenance may be authorized under NWP 3.
  • New NWP 52:  NWP 52 applies to water-based wind and hydrokinetic renewable energy pilot projects, which is defined as an experimental project where the renewable energy generation units will be monitored to collect information on their performance and environmental effects.  For each project, no more than ten generation units are authorized.  At the pilot project’s completion, all structures must be removed, unless they become authorized separately by the Army Corps.
  • Department of Defense Notification Requirements:  For any activity that involves the construction of a wind turbine, solar tower, or overhead transmission line, a copy of any required pre-construction notification[4] and NWP verification[5] will be provided by the Army Corps to the Department of Defense Siting Clearinghouse, which will evaluate potential effects on military activities.

The new NWPs will become effective on March 19, 2012.


[1]  77 Fed. Reg. 10184 (Feb. 21, 2012).
[2]  33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
[3]  77 Fed. Reg. at 10290.
[4]  Pre-construction notification allows district engineers to review proposed NWP activities to ensure that they will result in minimal adverse impacts.  See 77 Fed. Reg. at 10188.  A project developer is required to give pre-construction notification under some NWPs.
[5]  NWP holders may, and in some cases must, request NWP verification, a confirmation from a district engineer that an activity complies with the terms and conditions of an NWP.  See 33 C.F.R. § 330.6.

Congress Replaces Forest Service Appeals with Pre-Decisional Objection Process

By Janice M. Schneider, Laura A. Godfrey and Taiga Takahashi

The 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Appropriations Act), signed by President Obama on December 23, 2011, replaced the appeal process for most Forest Service actions with a pre-decisional objection process.  The Appropriations Act also gave the Chief of the Forest Service authorization to exempt Forest Service actions from this pre-decisional objection process in an “emergency situation”.[1] The new “pre-decisional objection process” applies to “proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974[2] and documented with a Record of Decision or Decision Notice, in lieu of . . . providing for an administrative appeal process.”

Previously, an administrative appeal process was available to challenge the Forest Service’s project-related decisions. Such appeals were to be filed within 45 days of the publication of the Forest Service’s notice of its decision on a project. Decisions on appeals were to be made within a 45-day appeal period. If no appeal decision was issued within this 45-day period, the agency decision became the final administrative action.[3]

The new process eliminates this appeal process and replaces it with a pre-decisional objection process as outlined in Section 105(a) of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003. The objection process will be the “sole means by which a person can seek administrative review regarding [the Forest Service’s decision regarding the applicable project] on Forest Service land.”[4] The objection process will begin after the completion of the environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS) and will end, at the latest, when the Forest Service issues its Record of Decision or Decision Notice. In addition, to participate in the administrative review process and object to a project, an individual must submit specific written comments regarding the proposed action to the Forest Service during the scoping or public comment period for the draft environmental analysis for the project.

Federal regulations implementing Section 105(a)’s objection process,[5] which originally applied only to hazardous fuel reduction projects, may provide a preview of this new process. If these other regulations provide any indication, the time to file an objection could be reduced to 30 days following the publication of notice of the completion of the EA or EIS.[6] In addition, if no objection is filed, final decision may occur as early as 5 days after the end of the 30-day objection period.[7]

The new objection process is expected to decrease the time needed for the Forest Service’s review and decision regarding proposed actions as compared to the former appeal process, and it should provide more uniformity to Forest Service decision-making processes. Appeals available to project applicants under 36 C.F.R. pt. 251 and appeals of plan adoptions or amendments themselves under 36 C.F.R. pt. 219 appear to be unaffected.[8] This drive for efficiency in Forest Service process is also reflected in the Obama Administration’s recently proposed “Preferred Alternative for the Land Management Planning Rule”, which the Administration claims “will make land management on 175 national forests and grasslands cheaper, more efficient[,] and less vulnerable to lawsuits[.]

The Forest Service is currently in the process of drafting new regulations to implement this new pre-decisional objection process. An interim final rule is currently expected to be published by this summer and a final rule by this fall.

 


[1] The statutory language is set out at Section 428 of the appropriations bill (Public Law 112-74, 125 Stat. 1046)
[2] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14.
[3] See generally 36 C.F.R. § 215.15.
[4] See supra note 1.
[5] 36 C.F.R. pt. 218.
[6] See 36 C.F.R. § 218.10(a).
[7] See 36 C.F.R. § 218.12.
[8] Compare 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act § 428, supra note 1 (applying to “proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq.), and documented with a Record of Decision or Decision Notice, in lieu of subsections (c), (d), and (e) of section 322 of Public Law 102–381 (16 U.S.C. 1612 note), providing for an administrative appeal process”), with 36 C.F.R § 251.80 (applying to applicants “who hold or . . . apply for written authorizations to occupy and use National Forest System lands”) and 36 C.F.R. § 219.32 (applying to a “proposed amendment or revision” of a land and resource management plan, which is already subject to a pre-decisional objection process).

 

Federal Court Clips Criminal Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

By Buck Endemann and Taiga Takahashi

A district court in North Dakota is the latest tribunal to reflect the growing reluctance among federal courts to criminalize otherwise lawful acts that result in the unintentional killing of birds protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”). In United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. (D.N.D. Jan. 17, 2012),[1] the court dismissed several misdemeanor charges under the MBTA against three oil and gas companies that conducted drilling operations in North Dakota. The court concluded that the MBTA “prohibit[s] only conduct directed towards birds,” and does not “criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not directed at birds, but which incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths.”[2] Although the district court’s order is still subject to appeal, Brigham Oil offers additional comfort to wind developers, oil and gas companies, and mining operators who, during the course of lawful facility operations, accidentally kill MBTA-protected birds.

In Brigham Oil, the Government alleged MBTA violations arising from circumstances where migratory birds mistook the oil and gas companies’ “reserve pits” for safe landing areas. These reserve pits contained liquid and sludge byproducts of drilling operations, and the birds died after they landed in the pits and could not escape.[3] Although the pits were not fenced or netted, the companies maintained the reserve pits in compliance with state law.[4]  After an inspection, the Government commenced prosecution under the MBTA, charging each company with a misdemeanor violation for each dead bird found in each company’s respective reserve pits.

Although the MBTA is written broadly to criminalize a range of conduct, including the pursuit, hunting, killing, and trading of protected migratory birds,[5] the court found it troubling that the MBTA could extend criminal liability to lawful commercial activity that incidentally injured migratory birds. According to Judge Hovland, the Government’s broad interpretation of the MBTA would “criminalize driving, construction, airplane flights, farming, electricity and wind turbines[]” and “many other everyday lawful activities.”[6] Such an interpretation stretched the MBTA “far beyond the bounds of reason and common sense.”[7] The Brigham Oil court—consistent with Eighth and Ninth Circuit law—adhered to a relatively narrow, but clear, rule that the MBTA only criminalizes conduct “directed against wildlife”,[8] such as conduct by hunters and poachers.

Brigham Oil reflects a trend where courts have been reluctant to impose criminal liability for truly unintentional acts that indirectly cause MBTA violations. Although the Brigham Oil decision provides comfort for companies in the energy industry, the Government still might appeal the ruling, and the law regarding this issue is still relatively unsettled. But there remains some divergence regarding the appropriate standard for evaluating criminal convictions under the MBTA.[9]  Although older decisions have imposed criminal liability for indirect violations from unintentional acts, some courts have either noted distinctive factual circumstances or imported some requirement of prior notice such as:

  • Highly Toxic Chemicals:  In United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978), the court held the defendant strictly liable under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory birds. But the court limited its holding to the facts of the case, noting that the defendant “engaged in an activity involving the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical” and that “[i]mposing strict liability on [defendant] in this case does not dictate that every death of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party.”[10]
  • Actual Notice:  In United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 691 (10th Cir. 2010), the court upheld a criminal conviction under the MBTA because the defendant had actual notice that its equipment was causing the deaths of migratory birds in violation of the MBTA.

In the Ninth Circuit, where a substantial number of logging and renewable energy projects are being sited, it remains the law that “unlawful ‘taking’ under the MBTA describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers.”[11] Still, one relatively recent outlier is United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (D. Colo. 1999), where the court expressly disagreed with a narrow reading, declaring that “[t]o the extent [Ninth Circuit law] may be read to say that the MBTA regulates only physical conduct normally associated with hunting or poaching, its interpretation of the MBTA is unpersuasive.” The court noted in its description of the factual background that that the defendant utility association was prosecuted for its “fail[ure] to install inexpensive equipment” in an area that was “home to several species of protected birds[.]”[12] Moon Lake is somewhat consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Apollo Energies, where a party may be criminally liable if it has actual notice that its operations are “taking” MBTA-protected species.  Nonetheless, Brigham Oil appears to be another step in the right direction.


[1]       No. 4:11-po-005, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5774.

[2]       Id. at *23.

[3]       Id. at *5.

[4]       Brigham Oil, No. 4:11-po-005, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5774, at *5-6.

[5]       16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 707.

[6]       Id. at *31.

[7]       Id. at *33.

[8]       Id. at *28.

[9]       Several other courts have previously held that lawful commercial activity unrelated to active conduct like hunting does not violate the MBTA, and Brigham Oil’s holding is not unprecedented. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004) (logging); Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U. S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997) (timber sale); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (habitat destruction from timber sale); Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edington, 781 F. Supp. 1502 (D. Or. 1991) (timber sale); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv. 927 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (logging operations); Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (timber sale and logging operations); United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR 05-1516-MV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130674 (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2009) (evaporation pits); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009) (offshore oil well caisson).

[10]     572 F.2d at 908; see also United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (“When dealing with pesticides, the public is put on notice that it should exercise care to prevent injury to the environment and to other persons[.]”).

[11]     City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004) (second set of internal quotations omitted).

[12]     Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.

Court of Appeal in San Francisco Affirms Rule for CEQA Baseline Analysis, Allowing Marine Terminal Operations to Continue

By Taiga Takahashi

On December 30, 2011, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the Alameda County Superior Court’s rejection of petition for a writ of mandate based on California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and public trust doctrine claims. This case, Citizens for East Shore Parks v. Cal. State Lands Comm. (Cal.App., Dec. 30, 2011, No. A129896 [2011 Cal.App.LEXIS 1645]), involved the California State Lands Commission’s 2009 renewal of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.’s operating lease for a marine terminal in San Francisco Bay waters.

The marine terminal at issue was the Long Wharf Marine Terminal in Richmond, California, near Chevron’s Richmond-based refinery. Both the refinery and marine terminal have been operating since the early 1900s. Chevron acquired the refinery from Standard Oil in the mid-1970s. At that time, Chevron assumed the remainder of Standard Oil’s lease for the terminal. Because the terminal’s operation began nearly 70 years before CEQA existed, CEQA review of the terminal’s construction or operation did not occur. When Chevron’s lease expired in 1997, the State Lands Commission issued a Final Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and renewed the lease in early 2009.

The State Lands Commission used the current, operational condition of the marine terminal as the baseline in the Final EIR. Project opponents petitioned the Superior Court to force the State Lands Commission to re-open the CEQA record and reconsider the lease renewal. They argued that the baseline should have included only the existence of the terminal, not its operation. Because the action was a lease renewal, the project opponents argued that the baseline should assume a state of affairs in which the lease was rejected, even though their proposed baseline would have “reflect[ed] conditions that have not existed at the locale for more than a century.”[1]

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the proper baseline for CEQA analysis and evaluation of environmental impacts is “what [is] actually happening”, not what might happen or what should be happening.[2] This holding is consistent with a growing body of case law, including:

In sum, Citizens continues the growing trend in the case law indicating that the proper baseline for CEQA analysis must reflect current, operative conditions, not a hypothetical scenario based on projections into the future or normative ideas of what should be occurring.

 


 

[1] Citizens, supra, No. A129896, slip op. at p. 10.

[2] Id. at pp. 8-9.

[3] Internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted.

Proposed Reforms to Bureau of Indian Affairs Surface Leasing Regulations Could Encourage Wind and Solar Resource Development on Indian Land

By Janice Schneider and Stacey VanBelleghem

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has proposed significant reforms to its current regulations for non-agricultural surface leases on Indian land.  76 Fed. Reg. 73784 (Nov. 29, 2011).  The proposed regulations include new provisions expressly governing Wind Energy Evaluation Leases (WELs) and Wind and Solar Resource (WSR) Leases and would streamline the leasing approval process while allowing additional flexibility that is lacking under the current regulatory framework.  The leasing reforms are consistent with the Administration’s emphasis on this type of renewable resource development, and would make it easier for projects to navigate the regulatory requirements for leasing Tribal and individually-owned Indian land.  The BIA developed the proposal in consultation with Tribes, and the regulations are intended to preempt the field of leasing on Indian lands.  The public comment period on the current proposal currently closes January 30, 2012.  BIA intends to publish the final rule in 2012.

This proposal would create a dramatic change in the way the BIA processes non-agricultural surface leases on Indian land.  For example:

  • While the existing regulations cover all non-agricultural surface land leases without distinction, the proposed regulations contain separate provisions for residential leases, business leases and WEELs /WSR leases.
  • The new regulations would also provide flexibility and greater Tribal self-determination in the valuation of the lease, and would provide additional clarity on taxation issues.  While current regulations require both that the rent agreed upon in a lease for Indian land must be at fair market value and that an appraisal must support this valuation, the proposed regulations would allow the Tribe to determine that the negotiated compensation for the lease of Tribal land is in the Tribe’s best interest even if it is not fair market value and would not require an appraisal unless the Tribe specifically requested it.  Additionally, the rule would clarify that improvements on trust or restricted lands are not taxable by States and localities, without regard to ownership.
  • The proposal also expands the permissible compensation schemes to include in-kind consideration, compensation that varies at different stages of the lease, compensation determined by percentage of income, or, in the case of WEELs and WSR leases, even bonuses.
  • An additional significant reform is that BIA proposes deadlines for its review and approval of leases—business leases and WSR leases must be approved within 60 days of receipt with a potential 30-day extension and WEELs must be approved within 20 days of receipt with a potential 30-day extension.  However, it is unclear how BIA would meet these approval deadlines given its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental laws.  The proposed regulations require applicants to provide BIA “[e]nvironmental and archeological reports, surveys, and site assessments” needed to comply with applicable environmental requirements, so it is possible that BIA intends for this to include applicant-prepared NEPA documents. 

The proposed leasing reforms clearly signal BIA’s intention to encourage renewable resource energy development on Indian lands, and the reforms provide the transparency of a dedicated process for these types of leases, additional flexibility, and timely review.  However, it will be important to follow how BIA addresses environmental review when and if the current proposal is promulgated.

Federal Government Seeks to Establish a Competitive Process for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development

By Janice Schneider and Joshua Marnitz

Last week, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published in the Federal Register an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking outlining a competitive process for leasing public lands for solar and wind energy development.  76 Fed. Reg. 81906 (December 29, 2011).  BLM believes that a competitive process will better enable it to capture fair market value for the use of public lands, as required under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) (43 U.S.C. 1764(g)), and ensure fair access to leasing opportunities for renewable energy development.  BLM will accept public comments on its proposal until February 27, 2012.

The proposed rulemaking would establish competitive bidding procedures for lands within designated solar and wind energy development leasing areas, define qualifications for potential bidders, and structure the financing arrangements necessary for the process.  The public lands available for competitive bidding would include those identified by BLM as Solar Energy Zones (SEZ) once it finalizes the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Solar Energy Development in Six Southwestern States (Draft Solar PEIS).  [A discussion of SEZs and BLM’s October 2011 proposal to restrict further the amount of public land available for solar energy development is available here.]  As BLM did not designate potential wind energy development leasing areas in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Wind Energy Development on BLM-Administered Lands in the Western United States (Final Wind PEIS) or its associated Record of Decision (ROD), it anticipates needing to subsequently establish Wind Energy Zones before applying its competitive leasing program to wind.

The rulemaking would enable BLM to offer lands through a call for nominations and a competitive process to solicit interest in parcels of land instead of simply through the existing application process.  While competitive leasing might potentially maximize federal revenues, the proposal would mandate additional procedures and would appear to require a new and redundant environmental review process for leasing.  These additional requirements could ultimately delay development of individual projects on the ground and potentially limit the ability to develop in areas not offered for leasing.

BLM states that the new regulations could also require:

  • Publication of a Notice of Competitive Offer, which would include a legal description of the lands involved, the process for conducting the competitive offer, a minimum bid requirement, the qualifications for potential bidders, and due diligence requirements for the successful bidder to submit a Plan of Development (POD).
  • Definition of a bonus bid competitive process or other competitive procedures, including sealed bids, oral auctions or ascending bidding, two-stage (i.e., a combination of sealed and oral auctions) bidding, or multiple-factor bidding, possibly structured similar to the method that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management provides for offshore wind leasing (30 CFR 285.220). 
  • BLM would issue a competitive ROW lease to the successful bidder, and require a POD within specified timeframes.  The review and approval process for the POD would again require compliance with NEPA and other Federal laws and regulations.  Approved PODs would include due diligence development requirements to ensure timely actual development.
  • BLM proposes that competitive ROW leases be 30-year fixed-term leases with specific terms and conditions, available for renewal.

 BLM is currently seeking comments on the following issues, among others:

  • How the competitive process should be structured for leasing public lands within designated solar or wind energy development areas;
  • Whether a competitive process should be implemented for leasing public lands outside designated solar or wind energy development areas (and if so, how the process should be structured);
  • What competitive bidding procedures should be adopted;
  • What is the appropriate term for leases;
  • How fees should be determined; and
  • What due diligence requirements should be incorporated into competitive ROW leases and thus required of project developers.

BLM’s proposal has the potential to impact not only project proponents’ ability to site solar and wind energy projects on public lands, but also the costs, terms and conditions of doing so.  Entities with an interest in these areas should consider participating actively in this process. 

Roadblock to California Greenhouse Gas Cap and Trade Program Removed, but Others Remain

By Michael Feeley and Aron Potash

A lawsuit which delayed and once threatened to dismantle California’s greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade scheme was largely resolved last week, removing one roadblock to California’s plan to be the first state to impose an economy-wide GHG trading program.  Under modified regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) on October 20, 2011, California will require certain emitters of GHGs to obtain allowances or offsets in amounts commensurate to their respective emissions beginning in 2013.  CARB may be forced to navigate other legal challenges, however, prior to the start of the cap and trade program. 

The roadblock CARB cleared last week arose out of a suit in which environmental groups, including the Association of Irritated Residents (AIR), alleged that CARB failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in approving the Scoping Plan, CARB’s detailed roadmap for reducing GHG emissions pursuant to the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32).  CARB is the agency primarily responsible for implementing AB 32, which requires California to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  CARB has promulgated regulations covering many of the initiatives detailed in the Scoping Plan, including the centerpiece cap and trade regulations in December 2010.  Although it may at first blush seem counterintuitive that environmental groups would file a lawsuit challenging a GHG reduction plan, the plaintiffs expressed environmental justice concerns with the cap and trade program and argued that a carbon tax would be a preferable approach for achieving the AB 32 emission reductions. 

A May 20, 2011, San Francisco Superior Court ruling agreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that CARB’s CEQA analysis of cap and trade alternatives was inadequate.  The court ordered CARB to redo the CEQA analysis and enjoined any further cap and trade rulemaking until CARB did so.  CARB approved an updated CEQA analysis in August.  In a December 5, 2011, order the court found the updated analysis to be adequate and discharged the writ of mandate it had previously entered.    

Although the now-discharged writ of mandate was stayed by an appellate court, the legal maneuvering may have played a role in delaying the start of the cap and trade program.  When CARB approved the original cap and trade regulations in December 2010, it directed its staff to issue proposed modifications to the regulations in 2011 to address a large number of comments and unresolved issues.  The injunction prevented CARB from issuing these proposed changes to the cap and trade regulations as quickly as it had initially planned.  CARB was not able to release proposed changes to the cap and trade regulations until July and September 2011.  Among many other changes, these regulations pushed the start date for cap and trade compliance obligations back from 2012 to 2013 (although CARB claimed that it was not the lawsuit that forced the change in the start date).  On October 20, CARB adopted the September version of the proposed regulations (which are discussed in detail here).

Expect to see additional modifications to the cap and trade regulations in 2012—when approving the modified cap and trade regulations in October, CARB requested that staff go back and make more changes prior to the 2013 start of compliance obligations.  In addition, various entities have discussed filing lawsuits challenging the validity of the cap and trade regulations on other grounds.  The arguments which could form the basis for these lawsuits include: the imposition of cap and trade compliance obligations upon electricity imports is proscribed by the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution; cap and trade allowance purchase requirements constitute taxes under Proposition 26 and require approval by two-thirds of the legislature to be valid; and, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate electricity sales under the Federal Power Act, so CARB authority is preempted.  Challenges based on these arguments, or others, could yet delay or derail the cap and trade scheme. 

California Supreme Court Approves Administrative Remand in Power Plant Case; Expedited Review of California Energy Commission's Siting Decisions Does Not Apply to Federal NPDES Permits Required Outside of Commission's Siting Proceedings

In a decision that could have widespread application to cases challenging agency action, the California Supreme Court in Voices of Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Board recently upheld the use of a procedural mechanism that some earlier decisions had held impermissible—the interlocutory remand to an administrative agency.  Use of this procedure can significantly expedite the litigation and the administrative proceedings when an agency makes findings that are not sufficiently supported by the evidence. 

In the case, the owners of the Moss Landing Power Plant applied to the Regional Water Quality Control Board for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, which must be reissued every five years, for the existing Moss Landing Power Plant.  At the same time, they sought the California Energy Commission’s approval to modify the plant.

The plaintiffs challenged the approval of the NPDES permit, alleging that it violated Clean Water Act section 316(b) by failing to require the “best technology available” for the plant’s cooling-water intake system.

Before reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ section 316(b) argument, the Court addressed two procedural questions.  First, the owner of the power plant argued that the case should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court, under the special provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act governing the siting of power plants.  The owner’s theory, supported in an amicus brief that the Energy Commission submitted, was that the Energy Commission evaluated the proposed plant modifications’ consistency with local, state, and federal law, including Clean Water Act section 316(b).  And the Energy Commission’s plant siting or modification decisions are only reviewable by filing a case directly with the Supreme Court.  Therefore, according to the owner, the case was required to be filed directly with the Supreme Court under the Warren Alquist Act. 

Reasoning that the NPDES permit is required by federal law, and is required under California law to be issued by the water boards, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.  According to the court:

Although the Energy Commission must make a general finding, before issuing a powerplant certification, that the project conforms to all applicable local, regional, state, and federal laws, such a certification cannot contravene, subsume, encompass, supersede, substitute for, or operate in lieu of, the federally required NPDES permit.

Second, the Court addressed the plaintiffs’ interlocutory-remand argument.  The trial court had found that one of the Regional Board’s findings was unsupported by the evidence.  But rather than enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, it ordered the case remanded to the Regional Board for further findings.  The Regional Board held a publicly noticed hearing on the findings, took new evidence, and affirmed their original finding.  The Superior Court then considered that new evidence, along with the earlier evidence the Regional Board had considered, and upheld the Regional Board’s issuance of the permit. 

This may seem like an arcane nuance that would only interest die-hard civil procedure aficionados.  But in granting the administrative remand, the Superior Court did something extraordinary: it allowed the Regional Board to shore up holes in the record mid-case, transforming what would have been a sure loser for the agency into a winning case. 

The Supreme Court held that this procedure, the interlocutory remand, is permissible.  The Court’s opinion seems even to encourage the use of this procedure in certain circumstances:

such a device, properly employed, promotes efficiency and expedition by allowing the court to retain jurisdiction in the already pending mandamus proceeding, thereby eliminating the potential need for a new mandamus action to review the agency’s decision on reconsideration.

Ultimately, after setting these procedural questions, the Supreme Court upheld the NPDES permit.

In sum, the case raises several issues and leaves several open questions that developers and financers should be aware of:

  • Opponents of new power plants are likely to argue that this decision undermines the Energy Commission’s exclusive authority over power-plant siting and that it permits project opponents to file lawsuits in Superior Court instead of the Supreme Court for a broad array of claims related to power plant sitings.  The case should not be read that broadly.  The decision says nothing to undermine the Energy Commission’s authority or the general proposition that any decision the Energy Commission makes as part of siting a plant can only be challenged in the Supreme Court.  It simply holds, unsurprisingly, that NPDES permits required outside of the Energy Commission’s proceedings can be challenged in their normal fashion, even if the Energy Commission analyzed related issues in its siting decision.
  • How broadly courts will use the now-Supreme-Court-blessed interlocutory-remand procedure is an open question.  Project opponents will no doubt resist this procedure, because it is relatively efficient, and delay is often synonymous with success for project opponents.
  • Another open question is whether the remand procedure applies to cases under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  The case overruled two CEQA cases that held interlocutory remands are impermissible.  However, the concurring opinion by Justice Wedegar stated that the majority’s analysis on interlocutory remand would not apply to CEQA cases.      

California Cap And Trade Back on Track, But Compliance Obligations Pushed from 2012 to 2013

By Joshua T. Bledsoe

As discussed in our May 24, 2011 entry, California’s proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade program suffered a setback on May 20, 2011 when a San Francisco Superior Court issued a writ of mandate enjoining the California Air Resources Board (ARB) from any further cap and trade rulemaking until ARB complies with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by analyzing alternatives to cap and trade (e.g., a carbon tax/fee).  Then, as now, many significant aspects of the cap and trade program remained unresolved and ARB had planned workshops and rulemakings for this summer to finalize the cap and trade program.  Some of the open items include critical program components such as the allocation of free GHG allowances, the use of auction revenue, the generation and use of offsets, and the designation of GHG intensity benchmarks for regulated sectors.  Based on its actions to date, ARB appears to be executing a belt-and-suspenders, parallel-path response to the Superior Court’s ruling.  ARB has sought reversal of the Superior Court’s finding of a CEQA violation and a stay of the Superior Court’s associated injunction, but at the same time it is seeking to remedy that violation.

As expected, on June 1, 2011, ARB filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District.  ARB followed up its appeal with a Petition for a Writ of Supersedeas on June 2, 2011, asking the First Appellate District to stay the Superior Court’s decision.  ARB’s Petition for a Writ of Supersedeas argued that the appeal itself automatically stayed the Superior Court’s writ of mandate, but also argued that even if it did not, the Superior Court’s writ of mandate should be stayed for the reasons set forth in ARB’s Petition.  On June 3, 2011, the First Appellate District:  (1) temporarily stayed the Superior Court’s writ of mandate, pending the its consideration of ARB’s Petition for a Writ of Supersedeas; and (2) ordered the Association of Irritated Residents (AIR) to file an opposition to ARB’s Petition by June 20, 2011.  On June 24, 2011, the First Appellate District granted ARB’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas, staying the Superior Court’s injunction and allowing ARB to move forward with cap and trade implementation until the Court of Appeal renders a decision or issues another order.

In the midst of this appellate action, ARB released a “Supplement to the AB 32 Scoping Plan Functional Equivalent Document” on June 13, 2011.  The Supplement is designed to address the CEQA flaws first identified by Superior Court Judge Goldsmith in his January 24, 2011 tentative decision in AIR v. ARB (discussed here) and finalized in his March 18, 2011 statement of decision (discussed here).  A public comment period commenced upon release of the Supplement and will end on July 28, 2011 at 5:00 pm.  ARB is aiming to prepare responses to comments and certify the Supplement at its meeting on August 24, 2011.

On June 30, 2011, ARB announced via email listserv that it will be proposing changes to the cap and trade program, most notably that 2012 essentially will constitute a dry run for the program.  Additional details will be available at a July 15, 2011 public workshop where ARB will discuss, inter alia, these proposed changes to the cap and trade program.  Prior to the workshop, ARB will make the proposed changes available in discussion drafts.  It appears that a separate listserv notice will be sent when these drafts are available.  Nevertheless, this is what we suspect the changes will include:

  • There will be no allowances issued for 2012 and no compliance obligation for 2012 GHG emissions.
  • Quarterly auctions of emissions allowances would begin in the second half of 2012, rather than February 2012 as planned.
  • Entities that emit more than 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year will begin trading credits at the end of 2012 to cover their emissions reduction obligations for 2013 and later.
  • The first three-year compliance period, which originally covered 2012-14, will be shortened to two years (2013-2014).

ARB is claiming that the AIR v. ARB litigation did not influence this development, but rather its concerns about potential market manipulation drove them to propose these changes.  ARB also is claiming that since the cap was already set for 2012 at roughly the level of expected emissions, California will not forgo any emissions reductions.

For additional details on ARB’s previously proposed structure of the cap and trade program, see our April 26, 2011 Client Alert titled Despite Litigation Roadblock, California Pushes Ahead With Cap and Trade Implementation.

San Diego District Court Allows the 117-Mile Sunrise Powerlink Project to Proceed

By James L. Arnone, Damon P. Mamalakis, and Janice M. Schneider

On June 30, 2011, District Judge Roger T. Benitez of the Southern District of California issued a decision allowing San Diego Gas and Electronic Company (SDG&E) to proceed with its construction of the Sunrise Powerlink, a 117-mile electrical transmission line that will connect the San Diego area with the vast renewable energy resources of California’s Imperial Valley.  When completed, the Sunrise Powerlink is expected to enhance the reliability of southern California’s electrical system, increase transmission capacity for power generated by renewable sources, and reduce energy costs to consumers.

In 2005, SDG&E began working with state and federal regulators to vet the Sunrise Powerlink under the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  This process culminated with the approval of the Sunrise Powerlink by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in December 2008 and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on January 20, 2009, after an extensive environmental review.

Several project opponents challenged the BLM’s Record of Decision (ROD) by filing an appeal with the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) in March 2009.  However, because the IBLA denied a motion to stay, the project opponents proceeded to file an action in federal court to directly challenge the BLM’s ROD.  Plaintiffs coupled their action with additional claims related to BLM’s amendments to the Resource Management Plan, as well as a Biological Opinion (BiOp) issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in 2009.  Soon after the plaintiffs filed their federal action, the IBLA affirmed the BLM’s decision on the merits, but the plaintiffs insisted that they still had the right to challenge the BLM’s ROD rather than the IBLA’s subsequent decision.

The district court disagreed.  Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs, SDG&E, and the federal defendants, the court reasoned that when the IBLA affirmed the approval of Sunrise, that decision became the “final agency action,” not the BLM’s ROD.  To hold otherwise would allow there to be “‘two independent, and potentially conflicting, “final” agency actions,’ which is impermissible.”  Accordingly, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ direct challenge to the BLM’s ROD failed as a matter of law.

The court similarly found that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the BLM’s RMP was not directed at a “site-specific action,” and thus was not amenable to judicial review.  The court explained, “As further review and permits are required for any action, the RMP does not mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, nor does it determine the rights or obligations of any party.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the RMP is not a final agency action and, thus, Plaintiffs’ claims based thereon fail as a matter of law.”

Finally, the court rejected the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims respecting the FWS’s 2009 BiOp as moot in light of a superseding BiOp issued in 2010.  The only claim against the FWS that survived the 2010 BiOp was whether the FWS was obligated to consider various projects that the plaintiffs contended were “connected” to the Sunrise Powerlink under NEPA.  Assuming without deciding that these projects were “connected,” the court concluded that the FWS was not required to consider them.  The court reasoned, “[B]y their plain terms, the regulations that require the BLM to identify ‘connected’ projects when issuing its environmental impact statement do not apply to the FWS.  Had Congress intended for the FWS to analyze ‘connected’ actions during its formal consultation process under the ESA, Congress would have stated so . . . .”  (Citations omitted).

California's Planned Greenhouse Gas Market on Hold for Now, but Other Measures to Proceed

By Robert A. Wyman, Jr., Daniel V. Van Fleet, and Aron Potash

California’s proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade program suffered an expected setback on May 20 when a San Francisco Superior Court issued a writ of mandate enjoining the California Air Resources Board (CARB) from any further cap and trade rulemaking until CARB complies with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by analyzing cap and trade alternatives such as a carbon fee.  ARB has surely been strategizing in recent months about how to respond as the court made clear in a previous tentative decision (discussed here) and statement of decision (discussed here) that the injunction would issue.  CARB publicly stated its intention to appeal the writ and seek a stay of its effect during the pendency of the appeal, and it is likely that ARB has also been working on the CEQA alternatives analysis ordered by the court.  If ARB is unable to stay the judgment, ARB’s planned schedule of cap and trade program workshops and rulemakings will continue to be disrupted, jeopardizing the planned January 1, 2012 commencement of the cap and trade program.  The writ is a partial victory for CARB, however, as the previous statement of decision had threatened to halt entirely CARB’s efforts to implement the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) by enjoining not just the cap and trade program but also a multitude of other GHG reduction measures, such as the low carbon fuel standard and the renewable electricity standard.

This roadblock to California’s cap and trade plan arises out of a suit in which a number of environmental groups, including the Association of Irritated Residents (AIR), alleged that CARB substantively and procedurally failed to comply with CEQA in approving the Scoping Plan, CARB’s detailed roadmap for reducing GHG emissions under AB 32.  CARB is the agency primarily responsible for implementing AB 32, which requires the state to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  Since CARB’s December 2008 approval of the Scoping Plan, it has promulgated regulations covering many of the initiatives detailed in the plan, including GHG cap and trade program regulations in December 2010.  Many significant aspects of the cap and trade program remain unresolved, however, and CARB workshops and rulemakings were planned for this spring and summer with the intention of finalizing such critical program components as the allocation of free GHG allowances, the use of auction revenue, the generation and use of offsets, and the designation of GHG intensity benchmarks for regulated sectors.  

Further work on the cap and trade program is on hold for now, though, as the court found in its March 18 statement of decision that CARB violated CEQA by insufficiently evaluating possible alternatives to the measures described in the Scoping Plan, including the cap and trade program: “ARB’s extensive evaluation of the proposed cap and trade program…provides the public with information about cap and trade only.  CEQA requires that ARB undertake a similar analysis of the impacts of each alternative so that the public may know not only why cap and trade was chosen, but also why the alternatives were not.”  The court wrote in its March 18 decision that cap and trade is not a “fait accompli” and criticized the Scoping Plan CEQA analysis for failing to analyze in more detail a carbon fee alternative to cap and trade.

The court’s March 18 ruling ordered petitioners to file proposed writs for the court’s consideration, and the petitioners filed two different proposals.  The petitioners’ Proposed Writ would have enjoined ARB from “any further implementation of the measures contained in the Scoping Plan.”  The petitioners’ Alternate Proposed Writ, which the court incorporated into its judgment, included an injunction only of further work on the cap and trade program and not of further work on other Scoping Plan measures.  CARB also prepared a proposed writ, which was not filed with the court but was described in the petitioners filing.  Under CARB’s proposed writ, CARB would have been allowed to continue all actions in furtherance of cap and trade implementation while it was working on the alternatives analysis except that it would have been prohibited from finalizing the cap and trade regulations with the Office of Administrative Law until the CEQA Functional Equivalent Document (“FED”) had been corrected.

The court took the narrower approach, ordering that its writ “shall specifically enjoin ARB from engaging in any cap and trade-related Project activity that could result in an adverse change to the physical environment until ARB has comes [sic] into complete compliance with ARB’s obligations under its certified regulatory program and CEQA, consistent with the Court’s Order.  This includes any further rulemaking and implementation of cap and trade…”  The Court also ordered CARB both to take no action in reliance upon the Scoping Plan as it relates to cap and trade and to set aside the executive order approving and certifying the CEQA analysis of the Scoping Plan.  Although the intent of the ruling appears to be to halt work only on the cap and trade component of the AB 32 program, this second portion of the court’s order potentially opens the court’s decision and the validity of the other Scoping Plan measures to attack on the ground that a court may only have the authority either to invalidate a CEQA approval in its entirety or not to invalidate any portion at all.   The court’s path of partially invalidating a CEQA action remains an uncertain area of California law.

CARB will almost certainly appeal the decision and seek a stay of the judgment during the course of the appeal.  CARB has argued that an appeal would automatically stay the judgment, which would allow cap and trade rulemaking to continue apace.  AIR could be expected to respond that the writ of mandate the court issued is prohibitory and that prohibitory writs are not automatically stayed.  The resolution to such a dispute over whether the judgment is automatically stayed upon appeal would probably turn in part upon whether the court were to characterize the status quo ante as being a state of affairs in which CARB was well on its way to finishing up the carbon market or one wherein neither a cap and trade regime nor a carbon fee had been implemented or ruled out.  If CARB were to succeed in arguing that the judgment is automatically stayed upon appeal, AIR could then argue for a lift of the stay on the ground that a stay would irreparably harm it.  If the writ were deemed prohibitory and thus not automatically stayed, CARB would have to obtain a writ of supersedeas from an appellate court in order to stay the judgment, a remedy CARB might argue for by describing the judgment as overbroad in its limitations on CARB’s rulemaking activities or as otherwise irreparably harming it. 

New CEQA Mediation Rules May Create More Delay and Confusion Starting July 1

By James L. Arnone, Damon P. Mamalakis, and Winston P. Stromberg

In just six weeks, on July 1, 2011, troubling new rules will go into effect governing the mediation of disputes arising under the California Environmental Quality Act, California Public Resources Code §21000, et seq. (CEQA). These new rules — enacted last fall as part of Senate Bill 1456 (SB 1456) as a substitute for the more substantial CEQA reform many sought — appear at first blush to encourage resolution of disputes prior to the filing of any lawsuit challenging a public agency’s compliance with CEQA. On deeper review, however, the new rules appear to provide a new tool for delay and gamesmanship without meaningfully increasing the chances of settling legitimate disputes.  This can cause trouble for energy projects.

When a lead agency approves a project, the common practice under CEQA is for that agency to file a notice of determination (NOD), as doing so commences a short statute of limitations for any actions challenging the lead agency’s compliance with CEQA.  Short limitations periods under CEQA aim to provide certainty to project applicants and avoid project delay.  Beginning on July 1, 2011, however, project opponents may have a new arrow in their quiver to delay project implementation, an unintended consequence of SB 1456.

New Public Resources Code Section 21167.10, added as part of SB 1456, permits any “person” who wishes to bring a CEQA action challenging a lead agency’s approval of a project to file a notice requesting mediation with the lead agency and real party in interest within five business days from the date the lead agency files its NOD. This provision applies to NODs filed on or after July 1, 2011. If the lead agency accepts the request for mediation, the applicable statute of limitations for filing a CEQA lawsuit is automatically tolled until the mediation is completed.

Although resolution of disputes without litigation can be beneficial to project implementation, there appear to be several problems with Section 21167.10 as drafted.

First, other than the requirement that a person file a request for mediation with the real party in interest and the lead agency, Public Resources Code Section 21167.10 does not specifically require the project applicant’s/real party in interest’s consent to or participation in the actual mediation process. This is a very troubling omission. This creates a potential opportunity for inappropriate delay by project opponents, especially if counsel for the lead agency and counsel for the real party in interest are not in close communication on this issue immediately following the project’s approval. We especially foresee the potential for abuse if project opponents profess a willingness to engage in good-faith mediation efforts, thereby convincing a well-meaning lead agency to accept the request (potentially even over the project applicant’s objections), only to cause a long delay in the resolution of the litigation.

Second, Section 21167.10 does not say when the mediation must be completed, nor does it make clear that mediation can be terminated if the parties reach an early impasse or do not participate good faith. We have observed CEQA litigation being abused by litigants with no legitimate environmental interest but who, instead, merely seek to block projects or press projects to make economic concessions. The fact that the new rules fail to include a clear process for calling off mediation that reaches an impasse or is not being pursued in mutual good faith heightens the risk of CEQA litigation abuse.

Since it was always possible to toll the statute of limitations or to stay litigation to allow mediation to occur among willing parties acting in mutual good faith, it seems unlikely that these new pre-litigation mediation rules will offer any meaningful new tool to help resolve CEQA disputes. Given the risks that these new rules create, it will soon be even more imperative than ever for project applicants to communicate with the lead agency’s counsel immediately after project approval to discuss these issues, and, if warranted, to agree on an appropriate mediation process that maximizes the chances for settlement while avoiding the new rules’ opportunities for delay and gamesmanship.

Latham & Watkins has issued a more detailed Client Alert regarding these issues.  Please visit the Latham & Watkins website or contact any one of the authors of this post directly if you would like a copy of the Client Alert.

Court of Appeals vacates CAFO rules

In a March 15, 2011, decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated in part the Environmental Proection Agency's ("EPA") Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFO") rules, which we analyzed in a previous blog entry.  The Fifth Circuit struck down the requirement that CAFOs which “propose to discharge”—that is, which are “designed, constructed, operated, or maintained such that a discharge would occur”—must obtain NPDES permits.  Under EPA’s “propose to discharge” standard, a CAFO could be required to obtain an NPDES permit even if it had never discharged.  Similarly, under the now-vacated standard, if a CAFO which had not obtained a permit actually discharged, it may have then faced an enforcement action not only for the illegal discharge but also for failing to obtain a permit.  The Fifth Circuit rejected this “propose to discharge” standard and found instead that facilities which merely propose to discharge without actually discharging need not obtain NPDES permits.  EPA had promulgated the “propose to discharge” standard in 2008 following a 2005 Second Circuit decision which had struck down a previous “potential to discharge” standard under which EPA sought to require facilities to obtain NPDES permits unless they could show they had no potential whatsoever to discharge.  This ruling could impact the interest of companies in considering waste-to energy projects sparked by EPA’s CAFO rules. 

The Department of Energy solicits public comments on proposed changes to the international green construction code

By Linda Schilling, Charity Gilbreth, and Shirin Forootan

On April 14, 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) will hold a public meeting in Washington, DC to solicit comments on proposed changes to the new International Green Construction Code (IgCC).  There are approximately 1400 proposed changes addressing a wide range of issues—from vegetative roofs, to solar electric issues, to building envelope issues.  Hearings on the proposed changes are scheduled thereafter for May 16-22, 2011, in Dallas, Texas. 

The IgCC was developed by the International Code Council (ICC), which is a U.S. based non-profit organization that allows governmental jurisdictions and other stakeholders around the world to collaborate in the creation of model building codes.  ICC members include state, county and municipal code officials and fire officials, architects, engineers, builders, contractors, elected officials, manufacturers and others in the construction industry.  The ICC has published several comprehensive international codes, such as fire codes, fuel gas codes, residential codes, zoning codes, and plumbing codes.

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Court enjoins California's implementation of AB 32 greenhouse gas emissions reduction programs, including cap-and-trade program

By Michael G. Romey, Ryan Waterman, and Aron Potash

On March 18, 2011, a San Francisco Superior Court ruling (PDF) put the brakes on California’s implementation of its 2008 Scoping Plan, which established the State’s roadmap to achieve the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction goal expressed in the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32).  Pointing to alleged substantive and procedural flaws in how the California Air Resources Board (CARB) complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when approving the Scoping Plan, the court enjoined CARB from any further implementation of the measures contained in the Scoping Plan until after CARB “comes into complete compliance with its obligations” under CEQA.  The decision brings into question whether CARB will be able to proceed as planned with implementing by January 2012 the cap-and-trade scheme, which is the centerpiece of the first economy-wide program in the United States to limit GHG emissions.

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BLM extends public comment period for Draft Solar Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

David A. Goldberg and Daniel S. Feinberg

The Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) has extended the public comment period for the Draft Solar Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (“Draft Solar PEIS”) by thirty days to April 16, 2011.  The Draft Solar PEIS should be of interest to any developer seeking to build utility-scale solar energy projects or associated transmission infrastructure on public lands in the Southwestern United States, as the adoption of any of the study’s proposed plans of action could dramatically influence solar energy development on BLM-administered lands.

The Draft Solar PEIS is a detailed study released in December 2010 by BLM and the Department of Energy that evaluates the environmental, economic and social impacts of solar energy development on BLM-managed public lands in the Southwest.  As part of the study, BLM identified 24 “solar energy zones” (“SEZs”) that it deemed most suitable for environmentally sound, utility-scale solar energy development in six states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.  The study addressed three alternatives for managing utility-scale solar energy development: a solar energy development program alternative and a solar energy zone alternative (collectively, the “action” alternatives), and a no-action alternative.

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Woodward Park case holds CEQA contains no presumption that solar panels are necessary for development project with air quality impacts

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires government agencies in California to analyze and, when feasible, mitigate the environmental impacts of projects before approving them.  In Woodward Park Homeowners Association v. City of Fresno (PDF), the Court of Appeal recently held that CEQA does not automatically require projects with significant air quality or greenhouse gas impacts to include onsite solar panels as a mitigation measure. 

While the case is unpublished, it addresses a comment that is frequently raised in CEQA administrative proceedings—that if a project has significant air quality impacts, it must include solar panels.  And its reasoning may be instructive for other projects that face this issue:

Woodward Park's argument implies that it would be legal error not to require solar panels in virtually any project involving the construction of buildings. This cannot be correct. CEQA only requires an agency's findings about impacts and mitigation to be supported by substantial evidence. The general proposition that buildings using solar power are better for air quality than those not using it is not enough to show that substantial evidence fails to support the findings of every agency that approves a building construction project without requiring solar panels.

US Chamber of Commerce study: regulatory and legal barriers to energy projects delay cleantech efforts and prevent economic growth

Clean energy projects have tremendous potential to create jobs and grow the economy and help the nation meet its energy needs in a more sustainable way, but regulatory and legal barriers to energy projects have substantially reduced job creation and economic growth while impeding efforts to bring new energy generation facilities on line, according to a recent economic study commissioned by the US Chamber of Commerce as part of its Project No Project.  The report, entitled, “Progress Denied: A Study on the Potential Economic Impact of Permitting Challenges Facing Proposed Energy Projects,” (PDF) found that legal challenges, threats of legal challenge, and regulatory hurdles caused the delay or cancellation of 333 energy projects which, if constructed and operated for twenty years, would have potential economic and employment benefits of  a projected $3.4 trillion.  These estimated benefits would include $1.4 trillion in employment earnings and one million or more jobs per year.

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Army Corps of Engineers seeks comments on new nationwide permits (NWPs) for renewable energy projects

The Army Corps of Engineers recently proposed to reissue the existing NWPs (PDF) authorizing the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States for specified projects.  For those projects, NWPs can take the place of individual permits (PDF) under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.  Obtaining permit coverage through an NWP is generally quicker and less expensive than obtaining an individual 404 permit—so, for projects that fall within their scope, these NWPs have the potential to streamline one part of the approval process.  

Importantly for renewable energy developers, the Army Corps also proposes to issue two new NWPs—NWP A, for land-based renewable energy generation facilities and NWP B for water-based renewable energy generation pilot projects. 

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New CAFO reporting requirements create enforcement risks and waste-to-energy opportunities

The United States Environmental Protection Agency faces an obligation to propose, before June of this year, a rule under the Clean Water Act which will impose reporting requirements upon owners and operators of concentrated animal feeding operations (PDF), or CAFOs, which include certain dairy and poultry farms, horse racing tracks, rodeo facilities, and many other types of operations. 

As EPA estimates that there are thousands of CAFOs which should have applied for National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES, permits but did not do so (PDF), EPA is likely to propose that every CAFO—regardless of whether is has a permit or even discharges—provide information which will enable EPA to determine if the facility must obtain a permit and if it is otherwise in compliance with CAFO regulations. 

The expected proposed rule’s reporting requirements will place noncompliant CAFOs at heightened risk of EPA enforcement action.  EPA is also obligated to release to the public the information it collects on CAFOs under the new rule, which could place CAFO owners and operators at risk of citizen suits. 

In light of this expected proposed rule, the window may quickly be closing for CAFOs to come into compliance with CWA requirements, including by contacting EPA to self-report noncompliance, before EPA undertakes what could be a significant enforcement initiative.  Waste-to-energy opportunities may arise as CAFOs evaluate their waste management practices and potentially modify their facilities in response to the CAFO compliance push. 

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Ninth Circuit's "Federal defendant" intervention rule in NEPA cases finally meets its end

NEPA litigation over energy and infrastructure projects will soon get even more interesting.  On January 14, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned its twenty-one year old “federal defendant rule” that had long served to bar the courthouse doors to people with substantial interests in cases brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  (Wilderness Society, et al. v. U.S. Forest Service, et al., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 734 (9th Cir.).) 

The decades-old federal defendant rule had prevented many state and local governments, environmental organizations, and businesses with direct property interests at stake from intervening in lawsuits that sought to overturn federal agency decisions under NEPA.  This new ruling promises a sea change in the way NEPA cases are litigated in the Ninth Circuit.

Since 1989, federal courts in the Ninth Circuit have treated NEPA cases differently than all other cases involving federal agency defendants.  The old federal defendant rule severely limited and often prevented holders and beneficiaries of federally issued permits and approvals, including many energy generation and transmission projects, from participating as a party in the merits of lawsuits challenging the very permits and approvals they obtained at great effort and expense. 

That limitation was inconsistent with the plain language of the federal intervention rules, ignored the significant investments and interests private parties have in seeking and obtaining federal authorizations for a vast array of projects, and conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s test in favor of liberal intervention in all other cases. Most importantly, the limitation ignored the very real practical impairment that project proponents suffer when agency approvals are set aside.

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California Renewable Energy Siting Act aims to expedite projects

On February 7, 2011, a bill was introduced in the California State Assembly aimed at expediting the siting and permitting of renewable energy projects in the state, with special emphasis on the San Joaquin Valley. Assembly Members V. Manuel Pérez, Steven Bradford and Nancy Skinner introduced Assembly Bill 13 (AB13), the Renewable Energy Siting Act, with the goal of building on the successful implementation of Senate Bill 34 (PDF) (SB34) by enacting additional changes proposed by the renewable energy industry, labor, environmentalists and others.

According to the Renewable Energy Siting Act fact sheet (PDF), the Act has four main components:

  • Expands the SB 34 process to wind and geothermal plants, including the voluntary use of interim mitigation measures and an advanced mitigation fee, payment of voluntary fees to expedite project review and payment of a one-time permit application fee;
  • Requires the Department of Fish and Game to help prepare a regional conservation plan in the San Joaquin Valley for renewable energy development;
  • Allows renewable energy project applicants to provide information to the CEQA reviewing agency on the environmental benefits of the project; and
  • Provides up to $7 million to desert and San Joaquin Valley counties to revise their local plans to facilitate renewable energy development.

Full text of the act is available at www.leginfo.ca.gov.  The bill is currently in the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.

Green building opportunities and risks

The "green building" trend—which includes everything from designing development projects to include onsite solar panels, minimizing energy use, siting projects to use existing infrastructure, and a host of other "environmentally friendly" techniques—is gaining momentum.  According to McGraw-Hill, green building is expected to triple by 2015, ultimately representing 40–48 percent of the nonresidential construction market.  While there are clear advantages to building "green," along with opportunity comes the potential for risk.  As the number of green buildings increase, so too does the likelihood that claims may be filed related to the design, construction, certification, operation, and marketing of these projects.  The potential legal claims that may arise related to green buildings include claims for breach of contract, false advertising, personal injury, and product liability.  Linda Schilling, Charity Gilbreth and John Wilson have authored a Client Alert that will be of interest to anyone dealing with green buildings—including developers, designers, investors, occupants, and consultants. 

The National Offshore Wind Strategy--DOE and DOI Jointly Announces a New Framework for Wind Energy Development and $50.5 Million in Funding Opportunities

Eight Years.  That’s how long it took what will likely be the nation’s first offshore wind farm to obtain a federal lease.  It is little wonder, in light of Cape Wind’s struggle, that wind advocates have been pushing for greater federal support.  Earlier this week, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of the Interior continued efforts to answer that call, jointly announcing the release of "A National Offshore Wind Strategy" aimed at developing the tremendous wind resources off the nation’s coastlines.  This interagency effort is backed by 50.5 million dollars in DOE funding to support research and development of offshore wind installations.

The nation’s potential for offshore wind power is impressive: according to DOE, wind resources off the U.S. coastline (including the Great Lakes) could theoretically produce an estimated 4,150 gigawatts (GW) of energy—more than four times the current generating capacity of nation’s electrical system.   As the new strategy recognizes, however, the difference between theory and reality is significant.  Currently, offshore wind farms have considerably higher capital costs than land-based installations, due in part to increased equipment, installation, interconnection, and infrastructure costs.  For example, existing installation and maintenance procedures involve the use of specialized vessels that simply do not exist in the U.S.

Further, as a new industry, offshore wind faces unique and novel permitting challenges.  Multiple state and federal agencies have jurisdiction over the development of offshore wind farms.  In the case of the Great Lakes, for example, DOE notes that eight states and a Canadian province claim jurisdiction—with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers serving as the “lead agency” for purposes of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).  Adding to the complexity is the relative lack of data regarding the environmental and social effects of offshore wind installations.

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In California Wilderness Association v. United States DOE, Ninth Circuit invalidates Department of Energy's designation of national interest electric transmission corridors (NIETCs)

As part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act), the Department of Energy (DOE) was directed to identify NIETCs—which are essentially corridors with a pressing need for more transmission capacity for electricity.  The Act allows utilities a fast-track approval process for permits for transmission lines within an NIETC.  Notably, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may grant a permit for transmission lines within an NIETC if, among other things, a state agency fails to approve the permit application within a year. 

On February 1, the Ninth Circuit struck down the DOE’s designation of NIETCs, holding that the DOE failed to adequately consult with the affected states as the Act requires and failed to comply with NEPA.  So six years after Congress passed this legislation to expedite the construction of critical transmission infrastructure, DOE must return to square one, and begin the administrative proceedings to designate NIETCs anew. 

The Act specifically provides that it does not affect the need to comply with environmental laws, including NEPA.  And the case highlights the difficulty the Federal Government has had in trying to expedite infrastructure projects, including those related to renewable energy, without exempting them from NEPA and other environmental laws. 

The full case can be read here. (PDF)

Association of Irritated Residents ruling puts AB 32 Scoping Plan in question

Since the passage of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (otherwise known as AB 32), the California Air Resources Board (ARB) has met all of the Act’s deadlines for reaching the 2020 goal of reducing California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels.  This includes ARB’s December 2008 approval of the Scoping Plan (PDF), which established a blueprint for how ARB intends to meet the 2020 greenhouse gas reduction goal, and its December 2010 approval of cap-and-trade regulations, which would create the most comprehensive greenhouse gas program in the nation. 

A recent development in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board, a case challenging the Scoping Plan, has put into question the Scoping Plan’s approval, and the implementation of ARB’s cap-and-trade regulations by extension.  On January 24, 2011, a San Francisco Superior Court Judge issued a tentative decision that, if entered as the court’s final decision, would delay further implementation of the Scoping Plan.  The tentative decision concluded that ARB acted within its discretion in approving the Scoping Plan, and that its environmental analysis of the Scoping Plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was mostly correct.  However, the petitioners convinced the court that ARB's analysis of alternatives to the Scoping Plan was insufficient, and that ARB acted improperly by adopting the Scoping Plan five months before it published its responses to public comments on the CEQA document. 

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Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Association--new CEQA baseline case is likely to change the way some California agencies review clean energy projects

In Sunnyvale West Neighborhood Association v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (PDF) (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1351, a Court of Appeal in California has ruled that a project’s impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) must be measured against existing conditions—even when the project will not be built and the project’s impacts will not be felt for a number of years after environmental review.  

In the case, the City of Sunnyvale prepared an environmental impact report for a new road that was projected to open in 2020.  To analyze the project’s traffic impacts, the city compared projected traffic conditions in 2020 without the project and the projected traffic conditions in 2020 with the project.  The EIR also described the existing traffic conditions; but it did not actually analyze the project’s traffic impacts against the existing traffic levels, and nowhere did it add together just (1) the existing traffic levels and (2) the project’s traffic.

The Sunnyvale court acknowledged earlier case law holding that lead agencies have discretion in selecting the baseline against which they measure a project’s environmental impacts.  But, emphasizing that the baseline, however it is calculated, must reflect existing conditions, the court held that the city committed a legal error by selecting a baseline that was years in the future.  In the court’s words:

The statute requires the impact of any proposed project to be evaluated against a baseline of existing environmental conditions, which is the only way to identify the environmental effects specific to the project alone.

Most projects in California, including renewable energy projects, must comply with CEQA, the California analogue to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  And, as evidenced by the League of California Cities’ submission of an amicus brief (PDF) in the case, this opinion will likely change the way a number of lead agencies conduct their environmental analyses under CEQA.  Wind, solar, and other renewable energy developers with projects in California should be aware of this case and make sure the environmental impact reports for their projects comply with it.

Fossil fuel-fired power plants are critical to renewable energy future

Fossil fuel power plants are critical to California achieving its ambitious goals for a high-renewable, lowcarbon energy future. Today’s Los Angeles and San Francisco Daily Journal has an interesting thought piece (PDF) penned by Michael Carroll and Marc Campopiano that discusses this seeming paradox. 

Large solar project on Federal land enjoined for BLM's failure to adequately consult Quechan Tribe on historic resources

Finding that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had likely failed to consult adequately with the Quechan Tribe over a large solar project’s potential impacts on historic resources, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order on December 15th granting a preliminary injunction that halts development of the project. 

The 709-megawatt-project is planned on 6,500 acres of mostly federally owned land in Imperial County, California.  On October 29, 2010, the Quechan Tribe, a federally recognized tribe with a reservation in Imperial County and Arizona, sued the Department of Interior, BLM to overturn the approvals for the project, alleging that they violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). 

NHPA and its implementing regulations identify certain Indian tribes that the BLM must consult with before approving or spending money on a federally assisted project.  NHPA and its regulations generally require the consultation to “be conducted in a manner sensitive to the concerns and needs of the Indian tribe” and to “recognize the government-to-government relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.”  NHPA’s overall goal is straightforward, but the regulations outlining the required consultations are detailed and complex.  As the court noted:

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Recent Legislative Changes Affecting Pending and Future Projects Under CEQA

With the enactment of Senate Bill 1456 (SB 1456) and Assembly Bill 231 (AB 31) on September 29, 2010, the California Legislature has taken preliminary steps to streamline the rigorous environmental review process under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), while also addressing the growing problem of costly and time-consuming lawsuits filed under CEQA.  This legislation is intended to promote a more efficient process for CEQA review and litigation by discouraging frivolous CEQA actions, promoting the use of mediation and expedited litigation schedules, strengthening the requirements for exhaustion of administrative remedies and allowing project applicants and public agencies greater latitude to use prior environmental analyses.  

Hoping to curb abuse of the CEQA process, SB 1456 allows a court to impose sanctions of up to $10,000 if a party is found have filed a claim that is frivolous, or “totally and completely without merit.”  Allowing the imposition of sanctions for frivolous CEQA claims will make it harder for opponents to delay or defeat worthy projects.  SB 1456 also provides a party the option to request mediation prior to the inception of a CEQA action and allows the Attorney General to seek an expedited CEQA litigation schedule when the public interest requires it.  Finally, SB 1456 requires that an organization challenging the approval of a CEQA document that is formed after project approval must include at least one member who had claimed before the approval that the CEQA review was deficient.

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